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When I decided to do a thesis focused on Energy Mergers and Acquisitions, EDP’s Privatization 
had just been launched and E.ON was one of the potential bidders. 
Soon after E.ON joined the pool of bidders, discussion emerged about E.ON’s motivations for 
the deal. Was E.ON interested in the deal for the value creation potential of acquiring EDP or 
was it being pressed by Berlin to participate in the bid and help show worldwide investors that 
the Portuguese Privatization Program was credible and contained attractive investing 
opportunities? 
Another question that arose was if E.ON would be willing to pay a fair price for EDP or if they 
were just looking to the deal as good bargain from a seller (Portuguese State) in need. 
This thesis intends to help answering these two questions. 
After revising valuation and M&A literature, I focused on analyzing the energy sector and both 
companies’ profiles. I concluded that there was, in fact, perfect economic reasoning for E.ON 
bidding for EDP. 
EDP acquisition would allow E.ON to accomplish two major strategic goals: increase the 
foothold in renewables and expand its presence in fast growing emerging markets. 
When I finished covering the first question, E.ON had already made the bid in late 2011. This 
allowed analyzing a posteriori the bid and concluding that the bid price offered by E.ON was 
reasonably below the fair price they could have paid. 
Ultimately, E.ON lost the bid to China Three Gorges which proposed a higher price and more 
favorable payment terms. E.ON lost a good opportunity to add growth and diversification to its 
business portfolio. 
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Writing a master thesis on M&A whilst working full-time on investment banking proved to be a 
very rewarding experience. It allowed me to refresh and profound the theory that many times 
is used without questioning on daily practice.  
I would like to thank Professor Peter Tsvetkov, for the insightful feedback and guidance 
throughout the making of the thesis; to Filipe Rodrigues, from Banco BiG, for the useful inputs 
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1. Introduction 
This thesis has two main goals:  
1. Share with the readers an overview of and Mergers and Acquisitions (“M&A”) key 
ingredients: valuation techniques, analysis of company and industry backgrounds and 
deal rationale; 
2. Assess if EON’s bid for EDP had economic reasoning and, if so, if it was made at fair 
price or if there was margin for improvement.  
To accomplish these goals, I am going to start by presenting a Literature Review of the main 
methodologies and relevant issues regarding Valuation and M&A. 
The Literature Review will include references from academics and practitioners and will focus, 
always when possible, on particular issues relating to energy M&A deals. 
Following this chapter, I will depict the industry and companies background with the purpose 
of assessing if there is a strategic and economic rationale that supports E.ON acquiring EDP. 
I will then estimate financial projections for E.ON and EDP and value both companies and the 
synergies created from the business combination. 
I will conclude my thesis by comparing the real bid E.ON made in late 2011 (that was not 
successful) with a theoretical bid based on a fundamental analysis that will also take into 
account current sector, economic and capital markets background.  
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2. Literature Review 
2.1. Introduction 
The objective of this literature review is to share a body of knowledge which will enable 
readers with different backgrounds to go through the case. 
The body of the literature review below is divided in two segments: 
 Valuation: where I depict the most common valuation methods according to books 
and articles of reference; 
 Mergers & Acquisitions: in this segment I present different views and opinions 
contained in contemporary scientific papers and that shed some discussion about the 
merits of such operations. 
The literature review in this thesis does not propose to be extensive but clarifying. I took the 
option of limiting the variety of subjects to those that are material to understand the case. If 
the reader intends to extend their knowledge on valuation, it is advisable to additionally read 
through contemporary valuation and/or corporate finance books. 
     
2.2. Valuation 
There are several valuation methods of different complexity and used with different purposes. 
Concerning our journey through the analysis of an E.ON bid for EDP, a brief explanation about 
valuation methodologies will allow covering two objectives: 
 Understand the importance of valuation as a tool for shareholder wealth maximization 
(valuation in a Corporate Finance perspective); 
 Understand the importance of valuation in determining the fair value of a target 
(company) both for the bidder and for the seller (valuation in Acquisition Analysis). 
 
I am going to start by focusing on standard valuation methods and then add some layers of 
complexity by addressing particular issues worth mentioning in an M&A context.  
 
2.2.1. Standard Valuation Methods  
There are three generally accepted approaches to valuation: Discounted Cash Flow, Relative 
Valuation and Contingent Claim Valuation (also known as Real Options). 
This literature review will cover only the first two, which are the ones to be used for valuing 
E.ON and EDP later on. 
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2.2.1.1. Discounted Cash Flow (“DCF”) Valuation 
Using DCF entails calculating the present value of expected future cash flows by discounting 
them at a risk-adjusted rate. 
The present value can be calculated using single rate discounting, typical in Equity and Firm 
Valuation, or multiple rate discounting, common in Adjusted Present Value methodology. 
I present below a short “guide” on how to perform these approaches.     
Equity and Firm Valuation  
Free Cash Flow to the Firm (“FCFF”) comprises the funds generated by the company that can 
be distributed to the company’s equity and debt claimants. Below I present a commonly 
accepted simplified formulation of the concept: 
Free Cash Flow to the Firm = operating cash flow (after taxes) -   net working 
capital – capital expenditures -   other assets 
Free Cash Flow to the Equity (“FCFE”) deducts from the above mentioned cash flows, interest 
and principal payments. It represents the cash flow available for a company’s common 
shareholders. 
Free Cash Flow to the Equity = Free Cash Flow to the Firm – interest (after 
taxes) – principal payments 
Now, that we have a common base of understanding regarding cash flows, the next step 
necessary to obtain a valuation is to determine an appropriate discount rate.  
Starting with the simpler case, to discount FCFE we must use a rate that represents the 
opportunity cost of the equity for a similar investment.  
A common approach to do this is using CAPM (Capital Asset Pricing Model): 
Ke = RF + βL (RM – RF) 
Ke = Cost of equity 
RF = Risk-free rate of return    
βL = Project’s levered Beta 
(RM – RF) = Equity market risk premium (expected return on the market – risk 
free rate of return) 
 
 The formulation above calls for some discussion about its main components: 
A) Risk-free rate of return: 
Damodaran (2008) states in his last study about the risk-free rate that the best proxy for 
this rate is the “default-free (government) zero coupon rate that is matched up to when 
the cash flow or flows that are being discounted occur”.  
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The question that arises nowadays, particularly when valuing Portuguese companies, is 
if Portuguese government bonds can be considered risk-free. Unfortunately, under 
current circumstances it would be optimistic to say so.  
But, Damodaran also provides an alternative for these situations consisting in netting of 
the implicit default spread. In practice, for Portuguese companies, this would lead to use 
as risk-free a figure close to the German Bunds. I will expand further on this subject later 
on under the contemporary cost of capital chapter. 
 
B) Project’s Levered Beta: 
The project’s levered Beta is a measure of quantification of the specific risk that equity 
claimants will be exposed to by investing in a project / company with a given capital 
structure.  
As it is very difficult to try to assess what the specific risk will be for a particular 
project, practitioners usually look for information available in the market, namely by 
averaging out Betas of comparable companies (I will go a little bit deeper about the 
subject of what is a comparable company in the Relative Valuation section ahead). It 
seems very simple, but what’s the catch then? Well, there is an intermediary step. 
Market data give us the equity (levered) betas for each company’s specific capital 
structure. Therefore, it is necessary to “unlever” each comparable company’s Beta, 
according to its capital structure, and only afterwards we can calculate the average or 
median asset beta for a “comparable” company/project. 
There are two approaches for unlevering beta. 
The more robust, as for instance Kaplan and Ruback and others are keen on, considers 
the existence of a Beta for preferential shares and debt:  
Bu = [Be X E + Bp X P + Bd X D X (1- tc)] / [E + P + D X (1- tc)] 
Bu = Beta unlevered 
Be = Equity Beta 
Bp = Preferential equity Beta 
Bd = Debt Beta 
E = Shareholders Equity 
P = Value of Preferential Shares 
D= Total amount of Debt  
tc = marginal corporate tax rate 
 
Other simplified approach, as used by many practitioners, assumes zero beta for debt. 
Additional, most of the companies don’t have preferential shares (at least, not the two 
we are going to look at in this thesis), so the formula to unlever beta could be 
simplified to:  
Bu = [Be X E] / [E + D X (1-t)] 
Bu = Beta unlevered 
Be = Equity Beta 
E = Shareholders Equity 
D= Total amount of Debt  
tc = marginal corporate tax rate 
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After calculating a benchmark (based on an average, median or other statistic) for the 
project’s unlevered risk, we then can apply the project’s capital structure and 
determine its cost of equity (Ke).   
C) Equity Market Risk Premium (“EMRP”): 
EMRP represents a proxy for measuring systematic risk associated to investing in 
equity shares. The Financial Times, for instance, defines it as the additional return an 
investor expects to earn for holding a stock or investing in shares generally, against 
what they would earn holding less risky assets like bonds (…)”.  
There is some debate about what’s the soundest way to calculate EMRP, namely 
regarding the share-bond return spread calculation. Kaplan and Ruback (1996) 
concluded in a study that the long-term arithmetic average of the historical return 
spread between the stock market index and riskless bonds appears to be the best 
alternative. 
Not disregarding the theoretical models that can be used, one could also use market 
risk-premiums considered by investment banks or research houses. These, incorporate 
the financial investors and decision-makers views within a certain window of time and 
translate the existing market sentiment at the time of the analysis (please see 
contemporary cost of capital ahead for further detail on this subject).  
 
Adding some complexity to the discount rate issue, I move on to explaining Weighted Average 
Cost of Capital (WACC). 
WACC is the discount rate to use when applying Firm Valuation approach. This discount rate 
accounts for the costs of the different sources of financing, weighted according to their 
relative contribution for the company’s capital structure. 
WACC = (D/V) KD (1-tc) + (E/V) KE 
D/V = proportion of total value (V) claimed by debt (D) 
E/V = proportion of total value (V) claimed by equity (E) 
KD = required rate of return on debt capital 
KE = required rate of return on equity capital 
tc = marginal corporate tax rate 
 
Albeit WACC being a weighted average, it usually bares the limitation of assuming that the 
company’s capital structure will remain constant at a medium to long term benchmark level. In 
an M&A context, where acquisitions structures could be significantly leveraged, this could lead 
to a value distortion. 
If the company’s capital structure is somewhat stable this hurdle is less material, but for 
changing capital structures there are two alternatives if one wants to remain faithful to a cash 
flow based approach: 
 Calculate a WACC for each year of the explicit period of projections until the capital 
structure is expected to remain stable; 
 Use an Adjusted Present Value approach, as I’ll introduce next.  
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Adjusted Present Value (“APV”) 
APV is another approach involving discounted cash flows and it has some additional merits 
when comparing to the approaches explained above. 
Luehrman (1997), for example, is one of the several academics and practitioners stating that 
APV adds information when comparing to WACC. 
The method consists in valuing separately operations and financing side effects.  
The former refers to the value of the company/ project as if it was financed entirely with 
equity and is obtained by discounting the cash flows generated by the assets/operations at the 
rate of return required by investors from assets with same riskiness and fully equity financed.  
Regarding financing side effects, usually interest tax shields accounts for the bulk of relevant 
value relating to these effects. But it also includes a variety of other financing related impacts, 
such as subsidies or costs of financial distress. 
At what rate these financing related cash flows should be discounted is a subject open to 
discussion, partially because their value can only be reaped if the company has operating 
profits. Luehrman (1997), for instance, defends that this should be accounted for by using a 
discount rate just above the cost of debt. On the other hand, Froot and Kester (1995) say we 
can use the cost of debt assuming they are realized with the same degree of risk than the debt 
associated with those tax shields.      
As for the advantages of using APV, Luehrman (1997) stresses that it allows valuing the several 
sources of value creation, which is particularly relevant in an M&A context, without having to 
face the defying challenge of defining a capital structure for each one.  
This kind of analysis enables a better assessment of which synergies and other value creation 
initiatives are long-term or short-term. Additionally, it enhances the chances of their successful 
implementation by providing a monitoring tool for future performance measurement on each 
relevant value creation initiative. 
 
DCF based valuations appear to be the most consistent approach for valuation as shown by a 
study from Kaplan and Ruback (1996) that analyzed 51 high leveraged transactions. 
Nevertheless, the authors also found evidence that “relative valuation” (also known as method 
of comparables) performs very satisfyingly and that the soundest valuation approach was, in 
fact, combining the two methods: DCF and Relative Valuation.     
 
2.2.1.2. Relative Valuation 
Relative Valuation consists in valuing a company (or an asset) deriving from the value of 
comparables companies by using a common variable such as revenues, earnings or cash flows.  
Multiples used in valuations are usually categorized in:  
 Market multiples: also known as trading multiples, allow to estimate a company’s 
value based on relative valuation metrics of comparable companies;  
 Transaction multiples: derive valuation from implicit information regarding to recent 
transactions of comparable companies. 
A variety of multiples can be used in valuations, ranging from the “ready-to-use” net income 
multiples, like the price-to-earnings ratio, to enterprise value multiples like the enterprise-
value-to-EBITDA ratio.  
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Net income multiples are more readily available, but as Goedhart, Koller and Wessels (2005) 
state, they are influenced by the companies’ capital structure, taxes and non-cash charges. In 
light of this, cash-flow multiples are commonly chosen as the best option to determine a 
company’s value. For example, Sarin, Koeplin and Shapiro (2000) state that multiples derived 
from earnings before interest and taxes are not influenced by the capital structure so they are 
a better proxy for free cash flow. They add that, if capital expenditures are expected to be 
close to annual depreciation value, EBIT could be a good measure, but on the other hand, if 
capital expenditures are negligible, EBITDA should be used.     
Depending of the specificities of the sector and the companies’ stage of development, asset 
based multiples or operational multiples could also be used (for example: EV-to-Regulatory 
Asset Base or EV-to-number of MW installed)  
Albeit this method of valuation may seem an oversimplification, it has a strong merit: it is 
probably the best way to capture the market’s current view regarding the potential value for a 
transaction of an asset/ company. 
Kaplan and Ruback (1996) state that comparable companies that are used as benchmark 
incorporate market expectations of future cash flows and discount rates. Hence, the multiples 
one applies in valuing a company should give a good proxy for market value of the company in 
hands. 
On the other hand, Kaplan and Ruback also highlight one of the most commonly stated pitfalls 
of Relative Valuation approach: to what extend can we select a large enough number of 
companies that are comparable with our subject of valuation? 
When forming a peer group one should be aware that both the companies and the 
transactions should be comparable. This implies scrutinizing cash flow profile, growth rates 
and specific risks to select the companies and analyze percentage of capital acquired, mode of 
payment and type of acquirer to filter the relevant transactions. Goedhart, Koller and Wessels 
(2005), for instance, indicate that trimming out the peer group by selecting most comparable 
Returns on Invested Capital and growth rates could add some robustness to the comparability 
of the companies.    
Relative Valuation is a practical approach and is commonly used by practitioners as a sanity 
check of a DCF valuation but it is not an approach that should be used in situations that have a 
very specific context. For instance, Kim and Ritter (1994) concluded in a study that Relative 
Valuation does not perform well for Initial Public Offerings Valuation.   
 
2.2.2. Special Cases and Contemporary Trends 
2.2.2.1. Cross-border valuation 
Cross-border valuation has a great deal of specificities such as deciding which currency to use, 
what tax rates to consider (domestic versus foreign) and how to account for special risks 
(foreign exchange, political), just to name a few.   
Discounted cash flow and relative valuation are commonly used by practitioners for valuation 
in M&A context, but their use has some limitations.    
Zenner et all warn that, in cross-border M&A related valuations, using market and transaction 
multiples could be limited because it is difficult to find comparable companies and transactions 
in some markets and because they do not easily incorporate the specificities of synergies, risk 
and taxes associated to cross-border transactions. 
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The authors state that a DCF approach is more flexible and therefore could be more 
appropriate to this kind of valuations. 
Many academics and practitioners like Zenner et all and Froot and Kester (1995) are keen on 
using, for cross-border DCF valuations, one of the two alternative approaches that I will explain 
next (for simplicity’s sake I am going to refer to them as “Approach A” and “Approach B”). 
 
Approach A 
This approach consists in: 
1. Estimation of future cash flows at foreign currency, 
2. Discount cash flows at a rate that incorporates local risk and capital cost, 
3. Convert Net Present Value at the spot foreign exchange rate. 
 
This approach entails several specificities. Froot and Kester highlight the following issues: 
 
A) Earned versus remitted cash flows 
 
When valuing cross-border investments involving developed countries, earned cash flows 
should be used despite the timing of their remittance. On the other hand, if there is a risk of 
expropriation or there is no opportunity for retained earnings to earn adequate return, then 
it should be used only remitted cash flows.   
  
B) Discount Rate 
 
Determining what discount rate to use in cross border valuations could be a challenge.  
For Approach A, Froot and Kester suggest determining first the discount rate using home-
currency rates of return for debt and equity and afterwards converting it to foreign-currency 
discount rate using interest rate parity.  
 
This approach sometimes could be mandatory as some countries may not have the 
commonly used inputs for WACC such as riskless domestic securities or market indexes to 
calculate betas and others. 
 
The cost of debt used should reflect the cost of borrowing for the project and also account 
for the marginal tax rate. Regarding the latter, Froot and Kester advice to use the higher of 
domestic or foreign tax rate, as it is the most probable to be enforced. 
 
The home-currency WACC can be converted to a foreign currency WACC by multiplying it by 
the differential between long-term interest rates in both countries: 
 
(1+ wacc foreign currency) = (1 + wacc home currency) X (1 + R foreign currency) / (1 + R home currency)   
 
R = nominal yields during investment period for each currency comparable-risk debt 
 
C) Adjusting for special risks 
 
When dealing with projects located in countries with more unstable conditions, some special 
risks should be accounted for in the valuation.  
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Risks like expropriation, inflation and other country-specific risks could be accounted for by 
adding a premium to the project’s estimated cost of capital. But, in order to reduce double 
counting of risks that may already be incorporated in the project’s cost of capital (beta for 
example) and increase transparency of the analysis, it is preferable that these specific risks 
be reflected explicitly on the cash flow forecasts. 
One alternative is to use scenario and sensitivity analysis to explicit the impacts of an 
eventual expropriation or other event in each forecasted year.  
Finally, Froot and Kester notice that when dealing with valuations that involve high inflation-
risk countries it is advisable to use real term analysis (instead of nominal).  
 
Approach B 
The alternative approach also mentioned by several academics is less commonly used but 
also worth mentioning as it should yield the same results as the previous approach. 
This approach can be summarized in three steps: 
1. Estimation of future cash flows at foreign currency, 
2. Conversion of cash flows to home currency,  
3. Discount cash flows at home discount rate. 
 
Several methods could be used to estimate exchange rates: interest differential, assuming 
that relative purchasing-power-parity holds for a period of time, or just simply quoted 
interbank forward exchange rates. 
The estimated exchange rates could then be used to convert foreign currency projections in 
home currency and afterwards discount cash flows at home currency WACC. 
Assuming the cost of capital differential incorporates exchange rates differential evolution, 
approach A and approach B should B equivalent. 
Froot and Kester also make a note to the importance that an APV approach could hold in 
cross-border valuation. As mentioned previously, the use of Adjusted Present Value is 
preferable when capital structures are expected to change over time and when subsidized 
loans or specific methods of financing with accounting and tax particularities exist. 
In a cross-border context, in addition to a possible changing capital structure, there could be 
important sources of value related to benefits like tax incentives to foreign investment or 
subsidies and other forms of below market rate financing provided by local authorities. APV 
is the best method to capture the value of these items individually. 
 
2.2.2.2. Looking to a company as a going concern: Terminal Value 
If a company or project is a going concern, its valuation should include terminal value. The 
shorter the “explicit period” where cash flow estimations are depicted, the larger proportion 
terminal value will have in the valuation.  
Kaplan and Ruback (1996) identify two of the main determinants of a company’s perpetuity 
cash flow: 
 Growth rate: it should incorporate expected inflation plus the real growth rate. There 
has to be sound arguments to support a real growth rate, otherwise it should be zero; 
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 Capital expenditures: at minimum, for no real growth perpetuity, capital expenditures 
should equal depreciation plus amortization in order to maintain a stable cash flow 
generating asset base. 
 
Froot and Kester share some additional insight on how to determine terminal value, namely by 
suggesting the following methodology: 
 
Terminal value = (EBIAT + depreciation – capital expenditures – investment in working 
capital) x (1 + growth rate) / WACC  
 
EBIAT = Earnings Before Interests and After Taxes 
 
Under this approach, capital expenditures and investment in working capital on perpetuity will 
be a function of the estimated growth rate (higher growth rates imply higher investments). 
Note that the formula indicated above yields a value that has still to be discounted using the 
project or the company’s WACC in order to obtain the Terminal Value’s present value. 
Given the large proportion of value usually contributed by terminal value, it is advised to 
develop sensitivity analysis to the perpetuity growth rate and other critical assumptions. 
 
2.2.2.3. Private company discount 
When valuing private companies, using multiples could be somewhat limited because, apart 
from the challenge of finding comparable transactions to the case at hands, most often the 
characteristics of public companies are different from private firms. On the other hand, using a 
standard DCF approach could also overstate the “real” value of the company because the full 
potential value could not, probably, be reaped by the current shareholders due to reduced 
marketability of the company’s stocks.    
 
A way to account for these constraints is to apply a discount to account for lack of liquidity on 
the private company’s valuation. 
 
This discount could additionally be justified by the fact that many times the previous 
shareholders of the private company are also senior managers of the company and could be 
offered above-market compensations to stay in the company after the sale, thus reducing the 
price paid by the acquirers, when in fact the “real price” received by the selling shareholders 
would be superior.  
There are also some additional discussion amongst academics about the best way to apply this 
private company discount, namely if it should be reflected in the discount rate or if it should be 
applied directly to the company value. 
As the companies to be analyzed on this thesis are both listed, I am not depicting thoroughly 
this subject, but the reader should be aware of two important issues on this matter: 
 Private companies transaction are usually made at smaller implicit valuation 
multiples than comparable listed companies; 
 The total value reaped by the sellers could be split amongst price paid and above-
average compensation after the transaction.  
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2.2.2.4. Contemporary cost of capital 
The economic and financial turmoil has been conditioning financial markets evolution and has 
impacted greatly economic agent’s behaviors and perceptions. 
One of the consequences is the questioning of traditional valuation models, namely if and how 
they can be used under abnormal market conditions. Cost of capital has, perhaps, been one of 
the subjects under most discussion. 
On broader terms, CAPM has been under scrutiny, namely the variables risk-free rate and 
market risk premiums. 
On a recent article, Damodaran (2011) says that can be used 3 alternative methods for 
estimation CAPM variables: 
 Using historic data; 
 Performing surveys to investors, managers and others; 
 Using implied variables. 
 
Using historic data fits the traditional approach already explained previously so, on this 
chapter, I am going to focus on market participants (companies and investors) views on CAPM. 
What to consider as risk-free rate is a subject much open to discussion nowadays. 
Citibank analysts (2012), for example, say in their yearly “Global Perspectives and Solutions” 
report that, conceptually, a risk-free rate entails no default risk and has zero correlation with 
the market but sovereign credit-default-swaps today indicate there is significant embedded 
default risk.  
Blackrock Investment Institute (2011) points out on a study called “Sovereign Bonds: 
Reassessing the Risk-Free Rate” that, on the years prior to the recent global financial crisis and 
subsequent recession, there was a broad consensus among financial market participants 
regarding the stability of sovereign debt markets.  
In this sense, sovereign debt was considered as benchmark for risk-free returns upon which all 
other assets traded at a risk premium, due to higher credit risk or limited liquidity. But, 
nowadays, there is the possibility of returning to AAA-rated corporate bonds as a benchmark 
for valuation, as it was used in the 1950s and 1960s.  
The particular situation of Portugal has not been disregarded by markets participants and 
observers. 
Dow Jones Newswires (2011) noticed that regarding Portugal, when it was already in the midst 
of the troika (IMF, European Commission, European Central Bank) intervention, credit default 
swaps on the five-year bonds of EDP quoted more than 265 basis points lower than Portugal’s 
five-year swaps spreads. 
On the other hand, Barclays Wealth (2011) alerts that even though CDS are treated as 
measures of risk it should be accounted for that they price can be distorted by a lack of 
transparency and liquidity and therefore some caution should be taken when using this 
instrument to value risk. 
It seems the markets are looking for a new risk free benchmark but appears to be still no 
common ground on this matter. 
Market risk-premium is other variable subject to discussion under current market conditions. 
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On this subject, Citibank analysts (2012) say that the Equity Market Risk Premium (“EMRP”) 
should reflect the risk premium over the long run and hence ought not to be subject to short-
term swings. But they acknowledge that implied EMRPs are higher (up to 8%) than historical 
averages (5-7%). 
If implied EMRP persists at current peak levels, firms may need to adjust EMRPs upwards. 
Regarding Portugal, a survey made by IESE Business School (2011) to academics and 
practitioners, concluded that the market risk premium used for Portugal is on average 6,5% 
(6,1% median), indicating a rise from previous levels. 
Damodaran (2011), after analyzing date from 1960 to 2010, found that using implied risk 
premium had the greater predictive power (when compared to historical data and surveys). 
But he also notices that if the market is overvalued or undervalued, one should use historical 
risk premiums. For someone that has no faith on markets, Damodaran advices to use the 
survey approach. 
Despite CAPM as its assumptions are under scrutiny, the truth is that circa 90% of 
organizations use CAPM to estimate the cost of equity, as a survey made by the Association for 
Financials Professionals (2011) concluded after questioning more than 300 financial planning 
and analysis professionals. Other conclusions of the survey are: 
 Risk-free rate: 46% use 10-year sovereigns as a benchmark; 
 Beta: 57% of organizations use Betas from Bloomberg database; 
 Market risk premium: 49% use a market risk premium between 5% and 6%; 
 Cost of debt: 37% use current rate on existing debt while 34% use forecasted rate for 
newly issued debt; 
 Tax rate: 64% use effective tax rate and 29% use the marginal tax rate; 
 WACC: publicly traded companies, as is the case of EDP and E.ON, use the current 
debt-to-equity ratio in most cases; 
 Valuing potential acquisitions: more than 50% use the cost of capital for a group of 
comparable companies and 37% use the acquisition target’s cost of capital. 
 
It is difficult to determine the best approach to follow given the variety of choices available 
and the arguments in favor of each one. What seems unquestionable is that CAPM 
assumptions are becoming more subjective and can vary greatly amongst practitioners. 
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2.3. Mergers & Acquisitions 
 
As Sirower and Sahni (2006) put it, few decisions carry as much risk to shareholders as a major 
acquisition.   
They say it is common stock markets having a negative response to M&A announcements and 
that this is a reflex of skepticism about the transactions generating value for the acquirers. 
Namely, there is usually doubt that synergies implied in the premium paid would be 
accomplished and that the value of each of the firms involved in the combined business would 
be maintained or increased after the merger. Additionally, it is difficult and costly to unwind 
mergers that go wrong, so when the harm is done, it is usually irreversible.   
On this chapter I will try to explain the rationale behind business combinations and if and how 
they can generate value for shareholders. 
Before that, as a way of introduction, it is important to clarify what type of transactions can be 
involved in M&A operations.   
A common categorization is just differentiating mergers from tender offers. For example, 
Loughran and Vijh (1997) say that “mergers are usually friendly deals that enjoy the 
cooperation of incumbent managers” whilst “tender offers are made directly to target 
shareholders, often to overcome resistance from incumbent managers”. 
On Damodaran’s Investment Valuation book it is possible to find a broader categorization, 
which I summarize below: 
 Merger: the target firm is integrated in the acquiring firm, usually by agreement of 
booth boards of directors; 
 Consolidation: a new firm is created by combining the acquiring and target firms. The 
firms involved in the operation cease to exist after the operation; 
 Tender offer: the acquiring firm offers to buy the outstanding stocks of the target at a 
determined price. The offers is made directly to the target shareholders, bypassing the 
board of directors of the target firm; 
 Acquisition of assets:  the assets of the target firm are transferred to the acquiring 
firm. The target firm can remain as a shell company or be liquidated. 
 
2.3.1. M&A: Where does value come from?  
Control and synergies are possibly the only two fundamental sources of value on an M&A. For 
instance, Martin and McConnell (1991) elected operational synergies and the disciplining of 
target managers as the main influencers of wealth gains in M&A.  
Also, value creation for the acquirer depends greatly on the deal structure, mainly price paid, 
and, for listed companies, market reaction. I will depict those topics further on but, for now, I 
will focus on the fundamental sources of value in an M&A operation.  
 
2.3.1.1. Control 
Gaining control of a company can be a driver for generating value from an acquisition due to 
the mere possibility of changing the status quo of how the target company is managed. 
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Shivdasani and Zak (2007) say that the opportunity to make business decisions, namely 
regarding the divestment of assets and the definition of the operational and financial strategy, 
is a generator of value. 
They also state that having the power to decide the capital structure of the target company 
could generate value, namely by increasing the company’s leverage and thus enhancing capital 
discipline in the company. This could be achieved by promoting a tight financial discipline, 
increasing cost-consciousness and implementing a policy of funding only value-adding 
investment outlays. Albeit the authors make a fair statement about the importance of 
unlocking value by deciding to increase leverage, it is important to regard that, nowadays, 
increasing leverage is much harder (and expensive) then it was when the authors made the 
study (in the pinnacle of the credit bubble).  
Wruck (2008) also recognizes that the benefits associated to control are possible mainly 
through concentration of ownership and at cost of restricting shareholder access to liquidity 
and their ability to diversify risk.  
On the other hand, he adds that these benefits could be reaped through the post-transaction 
implementation of more recurrent performance evaluation and strong incentive-and-reward 
structures that enable managers to be constantly driven by value creation actions. 
On a broader view, controlling the acquired company allow the acquirer to mandate a new 
management team, that could for itself be a generator of value due to better skills or assured 
alignment with the new controlling shareholders objectives.  
Wruck (2008) calls this the “value of control” and it could be summed up as an improvement of 
governance, possible through gaining control of the target. 
The reverse of this benefit is that, usually, the bidder pays a control premium that is no more 
than the price it is willing to pay up-front for the estimate present value of future expected 
benefits associated to gaining control of the target.  
 
2.3.1.2. Synergies  
Synergies are recognized as one of the main drivers for M&A deals and can be originated 
through operational enhancements or financial benefits. 
Damodaran (2005) has made a thorough study on synergy and highlights several operational 
and financial synergies as sources of value, which I resume below.  
 
Operational Synergies 
Usually, synergies created under an M&A context will either reduce costs or enhance 
revenues.  
As for cost reductions, they could be originated by improvements in long-term sustainable 
cost-efficiency initiatives (economies of scale) or by one-of optimizations.  
Regarding revenue enhancement, it could come from entering in new markets or introducing 
new products in an already established distribution network. 
Sirower and Sahni (2006) say that companies are usually more successful in reducing costs 
than in increasing revenue. They explain that cost reduction is an internal issue that is 
controllable, visible and tangible. On the other hand, revenues are affected by competitors and 
customer reactions. Additionally, usually cost optimization is tackled first and this can 
compromise the infrastructure to support potential revenue growth.    
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Damodaran (2005) identifies additional synergies associated to growth generation and says 
they can come from higher return on its investments, increased volume of projects or assuring 
growth for a longer period of time due to increased competitive advantages. 
Finally, the combination of different functional strengths is also a potential source of value that 
could impact positively both costs and revenues. In utilities companies, for example, the 
combination of engineering skills and management skills could be a powerful source of value. 
 
Financial Synergies 
There are several financial synergies that can be obtained through a merger. Damodaran 
(2005) identifies increased debt capacity, namely excess cash and tax benefits associated to it, 
as the most evident. 
Increased debt capacity, possible due to changes in rating, diversification of funding sources or 
enhancement in creditworthiness, is a potential source of value. The benefits of increased debt 
capacity have two main fundamental drivers: excess cash and tax shields.   
As for excess cash, it could be a source of value if it allows the implementation of high return 
projects that otherwise would not be implemented. 
On the other hand, tax shields associated to increased debt could be a source of value as long 
as the company does not incur into financial distress situations. 
But tax benefits encompass greater financial synergies than the ones strictly related to debt, 
namely the use of tax assets hold by the target or reduction of taxable income by acquiring 
firms with net operating losses. 
Damodaran (2005) also refers that there could be some value creation associated to 
diversification benefits by lowered volatility in income thus leading to risk reduction. On the 
other hand, if the both the acquirer and the target are listed companies (as it is the case on 
this thesis), this benefit does not hold because the shareholders have the chance to diversify 
on their own and not through mergers. 
Lewellen (1971) identified potential value creation also for the target’s bondholders, namely 
through a possible reduction of the risk perception of the company. After the merger, bonds 
could increase value since outstanding bonds may have been issued with coupon rates that 
reflected a pre-merger higher risk perception of the company. Albeit some decades have 
passed since Lewellen’s study, it applies perfectly to the case of EDP, which has a risk 
perception impacted by the fact Portugal is under intervention of International Monetary Fund 
partnered by the European Commission and European Central Bank. I will expand further on 
this subject on the Deal Rationale chapter.      
 
2.3.1.3. Value of control, synergy and impact on fair bidding price 
It is critical to value properly these two main drivers of value (control and synergy) as they are 
paramount in supporting negotiation strategies, or more simply, in defining the maximum 
bidding price that allows value creation for the acquirer shareholders. 
The value of control is the difference between the value of the target according to how it is run 
before the acquisition and the value of the company under new management.    
Damodaran (2005) clarifies that the value of control resides entirely in the target firm, whilst 
synergy requires two entities and is created by combining them. 
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For valuing synergies, two important issues should be addressed according to Damodaran: 
 Understand how will the synergy take form by determining impact on cash flow size 
and growth; 
 Estimate when the synergy will start to affect cash flows. 
Damodaran study about synergy (2005) explains that the most practical way to calculate the 
value of synergy is to value the combined firm with synergies, accounting for the impact on 
cash flows and discount rates, and then deduct the sum of the individual stand-alone valuation 
of each company.  
On the other hand, Damodaran also acknowledges the possibility of valuing synergies 
individually. According to the author, operational synergies usually translate in higher cash 
flows whilst financial synergies could come under the form of higher cash flows and/ or a 
lower discount rate. 
One of the possible drivers for lowering the discount rate, according to Damodaran (2005), is 
the impact on Beta. He advises using a weighted average of the unlevered betas according to 
pre-deal firm value and then lever it according to the combined firm capital structure. 
Considering the various alternatives available, it is not completely straightforward what 
discount rate should be used to value synergies, but Damodaran is an advocate of discounting 
synergy cash flows using the combined firm’s cost of capital. 
Apart from calculating synergy value, it is important also to determine how it can influence the 
bidding price. 
When defining the fair bidding price, it is important to account for how much of the synergy is 
contributed by the target and the buyer. To assure the synergies associated to the operation 
are in fact incremental, Sirower and Sahni (2006) suggest categorizing what the acquisition is 
bringing new to the combined company under same, better or new market access and 
capabilities. This way, it should become clearer where the synergies behind the numbers are 
coming from.    
Damodaran highlights that the more the synergy is contributed by the acquirer, more bidding 
power it has, because other contestants will struggle to match the bid.  
One relevant concern relating to synergies is not to overvaluing them. To make sure that the 
buyer is not overvaluing synergy or making too optimistic assumptions, Sirower and Sahni 
(2006) propose a methodology they call “Meet-the-Premium”. 
It consists in determining the revenue and/ or cost synergies that would be necessary to create 
the value implicit on the premium paid. This method allows the buyer to assess on a high level 
approach the global effort that has to be made to optimize the target’s Profit & Loss main 
drivers.  
The Meet-the-Premium methodology is a good “sanity check” for validating the realism of 
assumptions made to value the synergies implicit on the price offered for acquiring the target. 
 
All things considered, we can say, with some prudence, that gaining control of the target and 
creating synergies from the business combination can justify a higher bidding price than the 
one that would be offered on the basis of a stand-alone valuation of the target.  
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2.3.1.4. Other  
On top off the above mentioned issues, there can be additional sources of value in cross-
border M&A. They depend mainly on the context and potential of the specific country/ region 
where the target has the bulk of its operations.  
Zenner et all, for instance, state that the positive market response to announcements of cross-
border M&A (and thus value creation for shareholders) could come from a perceived 
advantage of benefiting from immediate market access versus a greenfield alternative. In fact, 
in cross-border M&A, foreign bidders appear to pay more when compared to competing 
domestic bidders. Kohers and Kohers (2000) say that this premium could be the recognition 
there is a price to pay for local expertise and market access.   
This kind of sources of value could be “boxed” under the label of “Operational Synergies” but 
many times they are more related to market perceptions and momentum than to quantifiable 
business plan inputs.    
 
2.3.2. Cross-border M&A: What is different?  
Apart from the necessary adjustments in valuation methodologies mentioned previously, there 
are some critical issues that should be addressed carefully in the case of cross-border M&A. In 
an article published in the Journal of Corporate Finance (Zenner et all), the authors identify 3 
main issues that should be analyzed thoroughly:    
 
2.3.2.1. Financing  
The main specificities regarding financing issues related to cross-border M&A transactions 
refer to payment methods and debt financing choices. 
In this kind of transactions, payment in cash is usually more advisable because of tax, legal and 
flow back limitations associated to payment in stock. For instance, index funds could not be 
able to accept stocks of foreign companies as a method of payment.   
If the acquisition is financed by debt, the currency and location of the debt are relevant issues. 
The currency issue is straight forward: it should match the target’s cash flows currency; but 
regarding location of the debt, the matter is more complex. On one hand, debt should be 
“close” to the assets and cash flows, but on the other hand, funding costs, market access and 
tax optimization could lead to placement of debt in a market other than the one the target is 
located. It all comes down to a tradeoff between cost enhancing and risk coverage (for 
instance, debt located in the same country of assets reduces risk of expropriation in 
developing countries). 
Another debt related issue, particular from cross-border M&A, is the possible impact on the 
rating of the acquirer derived from the market exposure of the acquirer.   
 
2.3.2.2. Currency risk management  
Intrinsically connected to the latter issue above mentioned (debt financing) but not limited to 
it, is currency risk management. According to the authors, this risk should be managed at the 
three stages of the acquisition: 
 Pre-close: risk related to foreign exchange fluctuations between a deal’s signing and its 
financial close; 
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 At-close: risk refers to the repatriation of target company’s cash flows (like dividends 
or inter-company loan interest); 
 Post-close: risk related to ongoing cross-border cash flow, cost versus revenue 
mismatch and translational risk (associated to accounting reporting: income statement 
and balance sheet).   
    
2.3.2.3. Taxes  
The diversity of tax frameworks across countries implies additional complexity in cross-border 
operations, not only related to the transaction itself but also associated to post transaction 
taxes.   
Tax issues could condition greatly the value created for the shareholders. Zenner et all 
highlight the relevance of seeking advice from tax experts to assist in cross-border M&A 
operations.  
 
Additionally, there are other matters that could become pertinent in cross-border M&A, such 
as language, culture, infra-structure assessment and others. As the relevance of such subjects 
differs on a case by case basis, I am not going to cover them on my thesis, but the reader 
should bear in mind that the set of non-financial related issues could also impact greatly the 
success of a cross-border M&A operation.  
 
2.3.3. Long-term value creation: True or Myth?  
This chapter includes an analysis of the conclusions of several studies about M&A creating 
value. It is important to acknowledge that studies give us conclusions based on analysis of 
“averages” and seldom companies perform an “average” acquisition. Therefore, it is 
paramount to understand what can make the difference and enable a value creation 
transaction. 
 
2.3.3.1. What does History tell us? 
The best way to assess the impact of M&A would be to compare shareholders wealth after the 
deal to how much would it be if the deal had not happened. As this is not possible, event 
studies, that analyses shareholders abnormal returns, and accounting studies, that analyses 
financial results, are a good proxy to determine the merits of corporate acquisitions. 
Albeit many studies have been made, the conclusions seem to differ somewhat depending of 
the methodology like, for instance, the benchmark used for comparing returns and the time-
frame of the analysis.  
 
Studies for everyone’s taste 
Some studies are more “positive” on their conclusions. For instance, Healy, Palepu and Ruback 
(1992) focused on the acquirer’s performance and found evidence that asset productivity 
improved after the deal, indicating that, despite dubious impact on returns, the acquirer’s 
fundamentals seem to benefit from these operations. 
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Jensen and Ruback (1983) also found evidence supporting M&A advocates. They analyzed 
thirteen studies from several authors and found an average abnormal return of 15,9 % for 
mergers and 29,1 % for tender offers during a period of up to two months after the 
transactions. On the other hand, they also state that this short-term gains could not hold in the 
long-term due to a possible overestimation of future efficiency gains and, consequently, 
leading to post-outcome negative abnormal returns.    
There are also more “neutral” studies like the one performed by Franks, Harris and Titman 
(1991). They found that there was no evidence of abnormal returns three years after the bids.  
A study performed by Bruner (2004) confirmed what seems to be the most common anecdotal 
knowledge about M&A. He revised the conclusions from 25 previous studies performed by 
other authors and found evidence for stating that M&A provides abnormal returns to target 
firm shareholders. As for the wealth of acquirer’s shareholders, only a minority of the studies 
Bruner revised seem to have found evidence for value creation but he states that, on average, 
the adjusted return from M&A activities to acquirer’s shareholders is around zero.     
 
Studies about energy M&A 
Becker-Blease, Golderberg and Kaen (2008) analyzed several energy related company 
transactions between 1992 and 2001 and found little evidence that mergers and acquisitions 
created long-term value for fully diversified investors. Additionally, they found that the stock 
price and operating performance of the acquirers under performed as compared to utilities 
that were not involved in M&A activities.  
Leggio and Lien (2000) findings on electric companies also seem to be close to the other non-
industry specific studies. They analyzed 76 merger announcements involving publicly traded 
electric firms and say have found evidence of merger announcement returns being 
significantly positive for targets of acquiring electric utility industry firms and significantly 
negative for electric utility acquirers when acquiring other electric utilities. 
Additionally, they concluded that acquirers from the electric utility industry earn negative 
returns and that the returns of targets in the electric utility industry are smaller, but 
nevertheless positive, when the business is regulated. They explain this could happen due to 
the additional hurdles the parties need to overcome in obtaining approval from regulators.  
 
2.3.3.2. What can make the difference? 
Having sound motivations for a deal could be the primary driver to set the difference. For 
instance, Bruner (2004) comments that entering an unprofitable industry because of 
momentum or glamour will hardly add value. 
But, even assuming there is a rational for the operational, there are several factors regarding 
the deal structuring that could influence greatly the success of an M&A deal. 
 
2.3.3.2.1. General Factors 
 
Price 
It comes without saying that paying the right price is paramount. One of the major challenges 
when structuring a deal is to define the maximum price to bid in the best and final offer. 
Master Thesis| Mergers and Acquisitions: An Energy Sector Case Study  
 
Henrique Bonfim Page 25 
 
Warren Buffet shed some light in why some bidders over pay on the 1997 Berkshire Hathaway 
annual report: 
“In some mergers there truly are major synergies – though often times the acquirer pays too 
much to obtain them – but at other times the cost and revenue benefits that are projected 
prove illusory. Of one thing, however, be certain: If a CEO is enthused about a particularly 
foolish acquisition, both his internal staff and his outside advisers will come up with whatever 
projections are needed to justify his stance. Only in fairy tales are emperors told that they are 
naked”  
Damodaran (2005) also makes some statements that go in the same direction as Warren 
Buffet’s. 
He says that overpricing could exist and be driven by biases in evaluation processes or by 
managers wanting to do the deal at any price. On top of that comes the apparent believe 
managers usually have that they are immune to the challenges of implementing the planned 
synergies.    
Therefore, a sound assessment of the possible hurdles of implementing the synergies and an 
unbiased fairness opinion by external advisors can impact the price to be paid, and 
consequently the value created for the acquirer’s shareholders. 
 
Mode of Payment 
Some studies point to the fact that the mode of payment could influence the value created.  
For example, Loughran and Vijh (1997) conclude in a study that acquirer stock returns are 
superior to benchmark only for tender offers paid with cash and that target stock returns 
diminish over time, particularly when payment is in stock. 
Sirower and Sahni (2006) say that paying with stocks sends a message that the acquirer has 
doubts about the materialization of synergy and thus wants to share the risk with the seller’s 
shareholders. 
On the other hand, Myers and Majluf (1984) say that acquirers prefer to pay with cash if their 
stock is undervalued and with stock if it is overvalued. Thus, the apparent increased value 
creation for acquirers that pay with cash could just be a consequence of markets self-
correcting undervaluation of the acquirer after the deal and not a consequence of the 
payment method.    
In addition to the mode of payment, Bruner (2004) also identifies the use of earn outs 
(contingent payments) and the use of collars (renegotiation of deal if certain values are 
surpassed) as contributors to profitability of an M&A deal. 
 
Alignment amongst all agents 
Bruner (2004) says that having deal-doers that are not aligned with the organization and the 
shareholder’s interests could comprise the success of an operation. Wruck (2008) adds a 
concrete example, namely by pointing out that there are incentives to dealmakers to make 
overpriced deals because of the fees received despite the value created.  
Also very relevant to the success of the transaction is the alignment between the management 
of the target company and the new shareholders, namely the shareholders of the acquiring 
company. For instance, in LBOs, where managers typically commit their own capital in the 
transaction, Jensen (1989) found evidence for equity returns over 700%. This is an expressive 
example of how, when management is fully aligned with shareholder’s interest, shareholder’s 
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wealth benefits greatly. More recently, Shivdasani and Zak (2007) also state that LBOs are a 
good example of how aligning the management with the shareholder objectives is a driver of 
value. However, it is important to notice that in LBOs management has usually a big part of 
their net worth invested in the company and this could be difficult to replicate in an M&A 
operation where the buyer is a company. 
 
Type of Operation 
Tender offers appear to be more successful than mergers according to several studies. 
Agrawal, Jaffe and Mandelker (1992) found that, after 5 years from the acquisition date, 
tender offers returns are higher in about 10% (absolute) than mergers. 
Loughran and Vijh (1997) also found that tender offers are more prone to create value than 
mergers, possibly due to appointment of new managers in the former. 
Bruner (2004) adds that tender offers, more precisely hostile bids, report superior returns not 
only by the replacing management but also due to a realignment of the strategy of the firm.  
 
Target Size 
Anecdotal knowledge tells us that the size of the target could influence the success of the 
operation. This could come from smaller companies being easier to integrate and synergies 
more easily accomplished and controlled for less complex situations. Damodaran (2005) says 
that a merger of firms of equal size could be more difficult to succeed due to cultural clashes. 
In fact, Loughran and Vijh (1997) found that abnormal returns for acquirers would depend, 
amongst other factors, of the relative size of the target versus the acquirer, decreasing when 
the relative size of the target increases. 
Sirower and Sahni (2006) add that relative size could also be measured under Shareholder 
Value at Risk in acquisitions (“SVAR”), which represents the premium offered in a bid divided 
by the market value of the acquiring company before the announcement. A smaller SVAR 
makes it easier to create value for the acquiring shareholders. 
 
Focus 
For setting up an acquisitions strategy, choosing between diversified or focused acquisitions 
seems to make a difference. 
Doukas, Holmen and Travlos (2001) found that markets react negatively to the announcement 
of diversifying acquisitions. Bruner (2004) states this could happen because focused 
acquisitions are a better way to potentiate existent capabilities and enhance implementation 
of synergies than acquiring unrelated businesses.  
In fact, Berger and Ofek (1995) and Lang and Stulz (1994) had already found evidence of this 
on previous studies, namely when they identified a “market discount” on the market valuation 
for diversified companies of 5% to 15%. 
 
Exogenous factors 
The reader should be aware that, in addition to the above mentioned issues, sometimes there 
are additional uncontrollable factors that could influence greatly a deal being successful. Just 
as an example, Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) identified exogenous factors like deregulation or 
technological change as potential influencers of deal success. But, of course, many more can 
exist.  
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2.3.3.2.2. Energy M&A Factors 
In energy M&A transactions in particular there are usually additional layers of complexity 
when comparing to non-utility deals. McDermot Will & Emery, an international law firm that 
advises on M&A transactions, points out the following critical issues to be addressed in order 
to enhance value creation on energy M&A deals: 
 
A) Broad Knowledge Base 
The energy industry has a high degree of complexity, involving not only energy itself but also 
environment, health, safety and other regulations affecting the industry. 
It is important to assess limitations on the intended use of the assets after closing and address 
fines, penalties and other unforeseen liabilities. Natural gas fired, coal fired, wind, solar and 
biomass power projects have specific risks and issues to be tackled. 
These factors imply the acquirer to have a broad knowledge base, or be properly advised, in 
order to limit overvaluation of the business or assets being acquired.     
 
B) Understanding the Risks Involved with Project Based Assets  
Most energy industry deals involve a portfolio of projects or development assets with own 
financing, interconnection rights, permits and real property rights.  
Additionally, development assets have incremental risks associated to the conclusion of 
several stages before becoming fully operational, namely regarding licensing, completion of 
interconnection, construction and commissioning. 
Even for assets under operation there is a risk of revenue delivery. Revenue contracts could be 
subject to performance guarantees, off-takers’ right to refuse performance, early termination 
rights and the allocation of risk between seller and buyer for force majeure events.  
A wide and profound risk assessment should be made in order to enable adequate risk-return 
evaluations of the deal.         
 
C) Identifying Energy Regulatory Issues  
Rules and regulations affecting the energy business are very different around the globe. The 
regulatory knowledge necessary to enable a thorough M&A transaction analysis will depend 
on the business or assets being acquired and the jurisdiction in which they are located. 
M&A transactions that involve several countries should address local regulatory specificities, 
namely regarding licenses, permits and approvals necessary to operate. Additionally, 
regulatory approvals and notices may also be required in the various countries the target 
operates. For instance, EDP acquisition implies approvals from European, US and Brazilian 
regulators.          
 
D) Understanding the Full Legal Picture  
 
Last, but not least, the energy industry is affected by legal issues beyond energy regulations, 
namely environment, health and safety, tax, employee benefits and real property issues. The 
acquirer’s team and advisors should dominate a multitude of legal knowledge in order to 
assure the success of the transaction and the continuation of the business after its completion.   
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2.4. Literature Review Conclusion 
Valuation techniques are useful to decide the bidding price interval the buyer can afford whilst 
pursuing shareholder wealth creation.  
There are several alternative valuation approaches than can be used on an acquisition deal 
context. The literature review included some of the most relevant and recurrently used by 
academics and practitioners:   
 Single rate discounting cash-flow models (Equity and Firm Valuation); 
 Multiple rate discounting cash-flow models (Adjusted Present Value); 
 Relative valuation (Market multiples and Transaction Multiples). 
The conclusion one can make after reading the valuation chapter, namely the methodologies 
and particularities of each approach, is that it is always more robust to use more than one 
approach and compare the results each one yields. 
For example, using a combination of discounted cash flow models complemented with relative 
valuation tools allows the potential buyer to: 
 Estimate a fair price interval considering the target forecasted activity; 
 Determine if that “fair” price is reasonable under current market conditions; 
 Compare the values obtained with recent similar transactions.     
I am going to use both Firm Valuation and Relative Valuation for EDP and E.ON further on. 
Overcoming the challenging tasks of correctly valuing the target and completing the deal at a 
fair price are just the first steps of a long and puzzling journey for accomplishing value creation 
from a deal.  
As we saw in the Mergers & Acquisitions chapter, the overall conclusion from studies regarding 
M&A value creation is that appears to be evidence that acquisitions add value for target 
shareholders only in the short-term. In the long-term, wealth gains are less consistent and 
seem to differ with particular characteristics of the transaction.  
For acquirer’s shareholders, only tender offers paid with cash seem to increase wealth in the 
long-term.     
Additionally, it seems also evident that there are no “average” transactions. 
In order to an acquisition to generate value for the acquirer, by achieving above “average” 
performances, it is very important that the deal makers structure with detail the operation and 
be confident about their motivations and ability to plan and implement business plans and 
synergies. 
The overall conclusion one can make after reading this literature review is that acquiring a 
company is a complex operation. 
The potential deal should be thoroughly assessed, strategically relevant and clearly create 
value for the acquirer’s shareholders. If these conditions are not all met, there is good chance 
a bad deal will be made.  
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3. Industry and Companies Background  
3.1. M&A Activity 
3.1.1. Global evolution and drivers 
 
On the past decade, the US has taken center stage for global M&A, despite the share of global 
deals transacted in the US decreased from 38% to 28% between 2002 and 2011. 
UK and other developed countries have also reduced their share of global M&A as opposed to 
the BRICs that are increasing their importance in the global arena. China, for example, is now 
responsible for 5% of the deals, rising from 1.4% in 2002. 
But, according to Ernest & Young, we have not reached a point where developed countries are 
all falling and emerging countries are all increasing their share of global M&A. M&A is still 
more robust in economies that have mature debt and equity capital markets, favorable 
regulatory frameworks and political stability. In other words, fast growth by itself is not a 
sufficient driver to make emerging markets as the preferential stage for M&A.   
We can see on the chart on the left that 
global M&A reached its peak in the pinnacle 
of the credit bubble in mid-2007 and was 
followed by two years of steep decline, 
especially after the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers. The apparent resurge in 2010 
appears to be slowing down amid the 
sovereign debt crisis. 
In 2011, global M&A volumes decreased 
more than 9% from the second to the third 
quarter, but it was Europe who saw the 
biggest drop in deal values, from US$ 230 
billion in the second quarter to US$ 130 
billion in the third. 
 
On its Q4 2011 Capital Insight report, Ernest & Young points that it’s an economic impossibility 
for the public and private sectors to deleverage at the same time without affecting growth 
severely. 
Bank financing for companies continues to constrict, leading to companies choosing to retain 
cash. Additionally, according to Ernest & Young’s last survey related to its Capital Confidence 
Barometer (CCB) companies are restructuring in order to increase resilience through improved 
operational performance and greater liquidity. 
Despite this not very favorable background, there are still some who advocate this is the best 
time to make acquisitions. 
For example, Professor Scott Moeller, Director of the M&A Research Center at Cass Business 
School, anticipates that now it is a good time to bet on M&A. He said in late 2011 “If you’re 
waiting for a better time and a better price for your deal, be prepared to see your deal 
snapped up by a competitor. Do the deal now or wave it goodbye”. Professor Scott Moeller 
backs his view point with Bloomberg estimation that corporates worldwide have circa US$ 3,3 
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trillion of cash and cash equivalents on their balance sheet and that private equity funds have 
cash reserves of around US$ 1 trillion. 
Ernest & Young backs this line of thought and says that corporates with cash on their balance 
sheets are making bolt-on acquisitions that are easy to integrate and are cheaper alternatives 
to buy capacity than build it organically.    
 
3.1.2. European energy sector evolution and drivers 
On 2011, energy sector 
experienced some recovery in 
European M&A volumes and 
values, albeit not reaching pre 
credit crisis levels. Central and 
Eastern Europe where the main 
stage for energy deals in 2011 in 
terms of total value, but when 
looking to the number of deals 
there is no clear leading geography. 
     Source: Rodl & Partner  
 
Deals within the energy sector 
have been driven by high 
commodity prices, divestments 
and a number of well capitalized 
players. Merger Market, a leading 
M&A research company, expects 
that a mix of companies looking to 
divest and a spectrum of buyers 
wanting to build strategic 
portfolios will drive energy sector 
Source: Rodl & Partner              M&A movements. 
Additionally, we are assisting to an increased interest from private equities in investing in the 
energy sector, attracted by diversification into a more resilient business. 
Other expected trend is an increasingly dominant role of Asian players acting as potential 
investors in European public utilities, specifically considering the context of the current 
Eurozone crisis and subsequent divestment programs relating to European utility companies as 
is the case of EDP. 
Companies seeking access to different geographies, technologies and customers are seen as 
the bigger drivers for M&A by industry players, according to Merger Market. Additionally, it is 
expected that the phasing out of nuclear energy promoted by the German Government will 
contribute for German utility players to look to acquire new assets relating to renewable 
energy and fossil fuels.      
According to a report from Rodl & Partner and Merger Market, senior M&A practitioners 
expect a significant increase (over 70%) of energy relating M&A activity in 2012, including 
across Europe. Despite this positive confidence, the current economic turmoil in Europe and 
perceived regulatory uncertainty could impact the future deal pipeline.  
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3.1.3. What drives cross-border M&A?  
Despite the credit crunch having constrained somewhat the action from private equities, 
another set of players have emerged in the last few years: emerging-market corporates and 
sovereign wealth funds. 
Higher relative valuations, as compared to developed market peers, stronger currencies, high 
commodity prices and growing economies are some of the drivers that led to an increased 
relevance of these players in global M&A. 
Additionally, there are also some long term drivers for cross-border M&A that have been 
becoming stronger. Zenner et all (2008) highlight the following: 
 Globalization: acquisitions can be a cheaper way than the greenfield alternative for the 
companies that search for new markets and/or lower cost of production; 
 Geographic diversification: emerging market players wanting to reduce sovereign 
exposure and diversify from commodities by acquiring companies in developed 
markets are good examples of how this driver enables cross-border M&A; 
 Deregulation: the reduction of barriers to the free flow of capitals and goods and the 
opening of capital of public infrastructure companies to foreigners are strong drivers 
for companies searching new markets. 
Of course there are also some obstacles to cross-border M&A, namely regarding protectionist 
sentiments, tax complexities, cultural factors and equity flow back constraints but these are 
becoming minor along the time. 
Portuguese current economic situation is itself a driver for cross-border deals, of course not 
because of its resilience but because foreign investment is needed to substitute domestic 
financing (being equity or debt).  
Portuguese companies are being impacted by a severe economic recession, increase of 
perceived risk of Portuguese assets and scarce and costly financing due to funding restrictions 
from national banks.  
Portugal based companies have seen access to funding severely constrained and the 
Government itself, in light of the MoU signed between the Portuguese Government the IMF, 
ECB and the European Commission, needs to divest from several fully and partially state 
owned companies. 
The current economic and financial environment will favor M&A transactions promoted by 
both the Public and the Private sectors in order to decrease leverage and increase 
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3.2. Energy sector: evolution and future drivers 
Recent economic events, particularly lower rates of economic growth, have had an impact on 
short and medium term energy trends but should not impact the increase demand for energy 
in the long term. 
The base case scenario anticipated by the International Energy Agency assumes increases in 
world primary energy demand of one-third between 2010 and 2035.  
The capacity expansion to meet this demand will drive an USD 38 trillion in global investment 
in energy-supply infrastructure from 2011 to 2035 (average of USD 1,5 trillion per year), with 
the power sector alone accounting for 45%. 
Source: International Energy Agency 
 
The evolution of the level and pattern of energy use worldwide will differ according to 
government policies on energy and climate change. For example, if there is a strong reduction 




In the past decade, coal accounted for almost 





Source: International Energy Agency 
 
It is expected that renewables and 
natural gas become increasingly 
important, meeting approximately 
two-thirds of incremental energy 
demand in the 2010-2035. 
 
 
 Source: International Energy Agency 
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Ernest & Young says there are an increasing number of large companies making plans about 
switching to renewables before the forthcoming “post-peak-oil” era. Renewables provide a 
good opportunity to corporates to manage their exposure to volatile energy costs and reduce 
their carbon footprint. Conversely, some of the emerging countries that have a strong growing 
energy demand are betting already in renewables and bypassing fossil-fuel generation 
investments. 
Renewables are very capital-intensive and 
therefore are expected to represent 60% 
of investment for 30% of additional 
generation capacity. The countermeasures 
of its investment cost are the 
environmental benefits and minimal fuel 
costs.  
Energy subsidies play an important role in 
shaping the energy-mix. They allow for 
consumers to pay lower prices, raise the 
price received by producers or lower the 
cost of production. 
 
There is a trend to reduce fossil-fuel 
consumption subsidies and reallocate them 
to renewable energy. In 2035, subsidies to 
renewable energy are expected to reach USD 
250 billion, up from USD 66 billion in 2010. 
These subsidies derive from long-term 
economic and environmental benefits 
associated to renewable energy but are 
necessary to meet existing targets for 
renewable energy production targets. Only onshore wind energy is expected to become 
competitive before 2035 and only in some geographies (around 2020 in the European Union 
and 2030 in China). All others will require continuing subsidies. 
Such subsidies impose a large financial burden on public finances and on consumers and there 
is some discussion if it is the most economically efficient way of reducing emissions.  
Governments are trying to balance having secure, sustainable and low-cost energy with 
reducing direct and indirect incentives that are costly such as feed-in-tariffs and loan 
guarantees. 
The European Commission identifies the following key trends for the next 40 years: 
 Increase in renewable energy demand; 
 Energy savings will be crucial; 
 The role for electricity will increase; 
 Capital investments will increase; 
 The fossil fuel bill will decrease. 
Increasing connectivity of markets allowing to trade energy across borders is essential to 
ensure that electricity is produced where it is most economical. Connectivity is also important 
to allow for flexible management of electricity (demand management, storage and back-up 
power plants) derived from the increased share of renewable energy, which typically is less 
constant. 
Source: International Energy Agency 
Source: International Energy Agency 
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It is expected that electricity prices will rise in the next decades either if the current energy mix 
is maintained or even if there is a bet on decarbonisation: 
 Under current energy mix, electricity prices will be higher due to increases in fossil 
fuel prices (gas, coal and oil) derived from increased worldwide demand, especially 
from Asia; 
 If the energy mix is changed for promoting decabornisation (bet on efficiency, high 
renewables, low nuclear and diversified supply technologies), electricity prices will 
also be higher due to heavy investments in new infrastructure and technologies. 
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3.3. Companies Profiles 
3.3.1. E.On 
 
E.On is a German vertically integrated power company with Generation, Transmission and 
Supply activities mainly in Europe. 
E.ON was formed in June 2000 by the merger of VEBA and VIAG, two of Germany's largest 
industrial groups. Following the merger, E.ON executed a far-reaching focused strategy and 
today is one of the world-wide largest investor-owned energy companies.  
E.ON is a global provider of specialized energy solutions. It has facilities across Europe, Russia, 
and North America, and nearly 79,000 employees.   





E.ON’s generation fleet is one of the biggest in Europe with major asset positions in Germany, 
the United Kingdom, Sweden, Italy, 
Spain, France, and the Benelux 
countries and is considered one of 
the broadest and most balanced fuel 
mixes in the industry with 370 steam, 
gas-CCGT, hydro and nuclear power 
plant units throughout Europe at 
around 300 locations with a total 
generation capacity of over 60 GW. 
E.ON produces power from many 
sources, primarily from nuclear 
energy and hard coal, but also from 
gas, oil and renewable sources. 
E.ON’s priority in power production is 
to guarantee a secure supply, be environmentally and climate friendly and remain affordable. 
In 2011 the E.ON Group's attributable generation capacity increased by 2 percent, from almost 




Renewables global unit is responsible for expanding renewables capacity across Europe and 
North America.  E.ON has almost 6 GW hydro and almost 5 GW wind and other renewables 
such as solar energy and bio energy of installed capacity. E.ON also has a foothold in wind, 
solar, biomass, biomethane, and marine energies and intends to be a global leader in 
renewables. 
 
New Build & Technology  
 
This global unit brings together the project-management and engineering expertise to support 
the construction of new power plants and the operation of existing plants across E.ON. 
Source: E.ON corporate website  
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Research and development projects for the E.ON Innovation Center are also encompassed in 




E.ON’s gas global unit operates along the entire gas value chain namely by having an 
exploration and production business and being also active in the global liquefied natural gas 
business. E.ON has a geographically diverse portfolio of long-term supply contracts with key 
producing countries making it a mainstay of gas supply security in Europe. This unit is also 





The Trading global unit buys and sells electricity, natural gas, oil, coal, freight, biomass, and 
carbon allowances. It has the objective of optimizing the utilization of the generation fleet in 
Europe, trading and procuring worldwide the fuel and carbon allowances needed to operate 
this fleet, and locks in margins for its generation business in forward markets. This global unit 
has as ultimate purpose to aggregate and reduce E.ON's commodity price risk. 
 
E.ON’s Key Financials 
  
E.ON has been able to grow rapidly its business in the last 3 years (compound annual growth 
rate of 19%) but at the expense of reducing the company’s profitability. Despite the drive for 
growth, E.ON’s management has been committed to maintaining leverage at very conservative 




In 2001, Trading activities contributed to more than 40% of E.ON’s Turnover but had a negative 
impact on the company’s EBITDA. On the other hand, Russia, Renewables and Generation 
contributed very positively for E.ON’s EBITDA despite representing a smaller percentage of the 
company’s turnover: 
  
E.ON - Consolidated Data (€ Million) 2009 2010 2011 CAGR %
 Turnover 79.974 92.863 112.954 19%
 EBITDA 12.975 13.346 9.293 -15%
% Turnover 16% 14% 8%
 EBIT 9.291 9.454 5.438 -23%
% Turnover 12% 10% 5%
 Net Profit 8.669 6.281 -1.861 n.a.
% Turnover 11% 7% -2%
Capex 8.655 8.286 6.524 -13%
Net Financial Debt 28.000 20.315 17.990 -20%
Equity Book Value 40.348 41.653 35.737 -6%
Total Equity 43.955 45.585 39.613 -5%
Net Debt/ EBITDA 2,16 1,52 1,94 -5%
Net Debt/ Total Equity 0,64 0,45 0,45 -16%
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Under the motto cleaner & better energy, E.ON has defined four strategic priorities for the 




E.On intends to focus more on competitive businesses and converging markets where it is 
possible to benefit from scale advantages and leverage synergies within and across regions and 
businesses, namely by:  
 Pursuing an integrated optimization of individual businesses;  
 Benefiting from economies of scale;  
 Capture cross-border synergies;  
 Better transform assets into value. 
 




E.ON currently operates businesses in two regions outside Europe: renewables generation in 
North America and conventional generation in Russia. Going forward, E.ON intends to expand 
into additional attractive and fast growing regions to build renewable and conventional 
generating capacity. E.ON plans to focus on offering solutions that significantly improve the 
energy supplies in these regions.  
 
In selecting new regions, E.ON expects to follow well defined criteria: large markets with 
above-average growth, a need for E.ON's superior skills and systems expertise, a stable legal 
and regulatory environment, and cultural compatibility.  
 
With this plan, E.ON aims to increase EBITDA from operations outside Europe from about 5 




E.ON intends to foster and sustain a high-performance corporate culture and enhance 































E.ON 2011 - Business Segments Breakdown
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competitive and demanding environment. Improving efficiency will become an ongoing 
process and a top priority across E.ON.  
 
The new setup will make E.ON leaner and more efficient and will ensure that the strategy is 
implemented faster and with greater clarity. The objective of this restructuring is to deliver 0.6 




The focus will be to create more value with less capital by deploying expertise and skills more 
effectively rather than simply relying on the balance sheet. 
 
E.ON’s capital will serve as an enabler, allowing it to focus on processes that create the most 
value but there will be more room to design partnerships that require less than full ownership 
and that enable each partner to contribute what they do best. E.ON plans to set demanding 
investment hurdles to ensure that its new growth projects create significant value, namely by 
demanding returns significantly above each project cost of capital. 
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EDP is a Portuguese based integrated energy player with international dimension. The 
company is one of the largest players in the Iberian market and the 3rd largest producer of 
renewable energy worldwide. 
EDP’s activity across different continents and countries comprises the following business 
segments: 
 Electricity Generation (23 GW installed capacity): EDP is the third largest wind power 
operator worldwide with wind farms in Europe (Portugal, Spain, France, Belgium, 
Poland and Romania), the United States and Brazil totaling 6,9 GW of generation 
assets. Additionally, EDP owns and operates hydroelectric plants (Iberia, Brazil), coal 
power stations and natural gas combined cycle power plants (Iberia); 
 Electricity Distribution: EDP is engaged in low, medium and high-voltage electricity 
distribution in Portugal (market leader), Spain and Brazil; 
 Electricity Supply: EDP is the largest electricity seller in Portugal, it is among the top 
five sellers in Spain, and is the third largest private electricity supply company in Brazil; 
 Gas Distribution: EDP has a relevant presence in Spain through Naturgas, the second 
largest operator in the Spanish market, and in Portugal, through EDP Gás, the second 
largest Portuguese distribution company. 
 
The following diagram depicts EDP’s international presence: 
 
 
Source: EDP 2011 Investors presentation  
 
Over the past years, EDP has delivered a sound operating performance. The company reduced 
slightly its operating margins in the last two years but the Turnover growth has enabled EDP to 
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EDP’s operating performance presents a low risk profile, with the Company’s EBITDA being 
approximately 90% originated from regulated activities or long term contracts. Additionally, 
the company has relevant geographical diversification (59% of EBITDA generated from 





EDP’s current strategic guidelines are focused on the following three pillars: 
 Controlled risk, aiming at managing the regulatory agenda in order to maintain a low 
risk profile of cash flows; 
 Superior efficiency, with a goal of further enhancing efficiency improvement in all 
businesses and geographies; 
 Focused growth, entailing a selective analysis of new opportunities, focused on high 




EDP - Consolidated Data (€ Million) 2009 2010 2011 CAGR %
 Turnover 12.198 14.171 15.121 11%
 EBITDA 3.363 3.613 3.756 6%
% Turnover 28% 25% 25%
 EBIT 1.970 2.063 2.267 7%
% Turnover 16% 15% 15%
 Net Profit 1.024 1.079 1.125 5%
% Turnover 8% 8% 7%
Capex 3.235 2.667 2.161 -18%
Net Financial Debt 14.007 16.345 16.948 10%
Equity Book Value 7.294 7.855 8.110 5%
Total Equity 9.978 10.785 11.387 7%
Net Debt/ EBITDA 4,17 4,52 4,51 4%
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3.4. Deal rationale 
Becker-Blease, Golderberg and Kaen (2008) say that industry shocks are one of the main 
drivers for industry clustering.  
It is possible to identify clearly one recent relevant industry shock that is the fled from nuclear 
power after the Fukoshima disaster. E.On has a major exposure to nuclear energy generation 
and is now pressed to diversify its generation mix. EDP is a good target to help achieve this 
purpose as it has a relevant exposure to renewable energy and no nuclear power generation. 
Financial Times published an article on November 2011 where it was stated that “EDP’s 
strategic and regional profile ticks several boxes on Eon’s wish-list. It has operations in Brazil, a 
country Eon identified as one of three markets of interest, and it is a big player in renewable 
energy, a sector in which Eon wants a bigger footprint.” 
In addition, the merger would also make sense for EDP. HSBC analysts say that E.ON has a big 
potential for developing value creation partnerships with EDP, namely by having a strong 
European presence. Additionally, E.ON could bring a relevant contribute for improving EDPs 
credit rating due to Germany’s sovereign rating. 
On the past few years, E.On made several domestic and cross-border acquisitions in order to 
gain exposure to new markets and strengthen its energy core business. In many cases, these 
acquisitions resulted from buying stakes from public institutions or sovereign shareholders, as 
it is the case of EDP from where the Portuguese Government intended to divest. 
In fact, one of the many conditions imposed to Portugal in order to benefit from financial 
assistance provided by the European Commission, European Central Bank and International 
Monetary Fund was the implementation of an ambitious privatization program, including the 
full divestment of public sector shares in EDP. 
Becker-Blease, Golderberg and Kaen (2008) found that many electric utilities implemented 
acquisition programs of other electric or gas utilities as a response to the deregulation of the 
electric power industry. In Portugal, albeit the energy sector is under regulation that limits 
players being fully vertical, tariffs are being liberalized in order to promote competition 
amongst electricity and gas merchants. 
Additionally, Leggio and Lien (2000) say that industry players look at takeovers or mergers as 
cost efficient means of restructuring and that many electric utility companies used mergers as 
a way to adapt to a competitive future. This fits to the case of E.On that is pressured to include 
environmentally friendlier forms of power generation in its energy-mix. 
A study from CERNA (Centre d’économie industrielle) that surveyed 135 M&A electricity sector 
deals in the European Union identified some interesting patterns in these operations that 
support the rationale of E.On buying EDP: 
 Cross-border M&A is responsible for about 35% of the deals; 
 Germany is the country with more domestic companies making acquisitions abroad; 
 In Portugal, electricity M&A is usually driven by foreign acquirers; 
 Liberalization and growth potential are important M&A drivers; 
 Vertically integrated companies (as is the case of E.On) are the most frequent 
purchasers in M&A operations; 
 Remedies are infrequent in electricity M&A; 
 Trend of concentration in the European electricity market and increasingly frequent 
large electricity companies acquiring other large companies.  
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4. Valuation 
On this chapter, I will start by determining a valuation interval for both E.ON and EDP. 
For each company, I will estimate financial forecasts and then define the valuation interval 
based on the outputs yielded by implementing three valuation techniques, namely: 
 WACC based Discounted Cash Flows; 
 Market Multiples; 
 Transaction Multiples. 
Additionally, I will identify and value potential synergies generated from the business 
combination and conclude the chapter by comparing the real bid E.ON made for EDP with the 
theoretical bid it could have made according to the valuation outputs I obtained.  
 
4.1. E.ON Valuation 
4.1.1. E.ON - Financial Projections 
 
E.ON performed a restructuring of its reporting segments in 2011, so drilled down information 
by current reporting segments is only available for the last two years. 
Fortunately, E.ON’s management forecasts main Profit and Loss and lines for each segment so 
it was possible to estimated E.ON’s financial projections using the management views for the 
business. To add an independent perspective, I also considered the consensus from analysts 
that follow E.ON for estimating the main cash flow drivers.  
I estimated financial projections for each segment (Generation, Renewables, Gas, trading, 
Germany, Other European Countries and Group Management) but I opted to present only the 
pro-forma consolidated projections on the body of the thesis to limit the amount of numerical 
information for the reader to process. Additional detail by segment can be found on the 
Annexes section. 
   
 
Globally, E.ON forecasted activity is estimated to slow down in the next few years, albeit it is 
expected that operating profitability can improve due to cost reduction initiatives that are 
being implemented at a companywide level and one-off costs that happened in 2011 relating 
to nuclear phasing-out.  
After a year where Trading activities grew expressively mainly due to CO2 certificates 
negotiation, sales relating to this segment are expected to decrease in the coming years for 
values closer to 2010 levels. 
On the other hand, Russia, Renewables and Gas are expected to be the segments who will 
contribute the most for the company’s sale growth. In the first two cases, growth will come 
€ million
Income Statement - E.ON 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Sales 79.974 92.863 112.954 107.704 108.634 111.678 114.722
Operating Costs 66.999 79.517 103.661 97.704 96.894 99.461 101.967
EBITDA 12.975 13.346 9.293 10.000 11.739 12.217 12.755
Depreciation and Amortization 3.684 3.892 3.855 3.937 4.345 4.165 4.279
EBIT 9.291 9.454 5.438 6.064 7.395 8.052 8.476
Master Thesis| Mergers and Acquisitions: An Energy Sector Case Study  
 
Henrique Bonfim Page 43 
 
from an increased allocation of company’s resources and investments, whilst in the later, price 
increases, rather than volume, are expected to be the biggest growth driver. 
All things considered, total Sales should decrease in 2012 and recover towards positive growth 
gradually in the following years. 
 
 
Note: I considered that E.ON’s effective tax-rate in the forecasted period would be equal to Germany’s 
current corporate tax rate. 
As to operating profitability, it is expected that operating margins recover slightly in the next 
few years, mainly benefiting from the increased contribution from Renewables and Russia, the 
two segments with higher EBITDA margins, to E.ON’s total EBITDA. 
E.ON strategy encompasses stricter investment criteria within the coming years in order to 
assure greater profitability of invested capital, which will lead to less investment opportunities. 
Based both on the management projections as well as on market expectations (reflected in 
analyst’s forecasts) I estimate that Capital Expenditures will decrease in the next few years 
until reaching less that 50% of EBITDA in 2015.  
 
For estimating E.ON’s working capital, I assumed that total net working capital in each year 
would be equal to circa 5,7% of the company’s Sales (equal to the average observed on the last 
three years).  
 
P&L E.ON - Key Indicators 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Sales - Annual Growth rate n.a. 16% 22% -5% 1% 3% 3%
Generation - Annual Growth Rate n.a. n.a. 2% 1% 4% 2% 2%
Renewables - Annual Growth Rate n.a. n.a. 26% 17% 11% 13% 11%
Gas - Annual Growth Rate n.a. n.a. 8% 7% 10% 8% 7%
Trading - Annual Growth Rate n.a. n.a. 47% -12% -8% 0% 0%
Germany - Annual Growth Rate n.a. n.a. 2% 1% 4% 3% 3%
Other European Countries - Annual Growth Rate n.a. n.a. 2% 1% 4% 2% 2%
Russia - Annual Growth Rate n.a. n.a. 29% 20% 12% 8% 8%
Group Management/Consolidation - Annual Growth Rate n.a. n.a. 12% -1% 1% 3% 3%
EBITDA Margin - % of Total Sales 16% 14% 8% 9% 11% 11% 11%
Generation - % of Segment Sales n.a. 25% 14% 14% 15% 14% 14%
Renewables - % of  Segment Sales n.a. 62% 60% 57% 61% 60% 58%
Gas - % of  Segment Sales n.a. 9% 7% 6% 7% 7% 7%
Trading - % of  Segment Sales n.a. 3% -1% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Germany - % of  Segment Sales n.a. 7% 7% 6% 7% 7% 7%
Other European Countries - % of  Segment Sales n.a. 11% 10% 9% 10% 10% 11%
Russia - % of  Segment Sales n.a. 30% 34% 35% 36% 36% 36%
Group Management/Consolidation - % of  Segment Sales n.a. 0% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1%
EBIT Margin - % of Total Sales 12% 10% 5% 6% 7% 7% 7%
Effective tax rate (% Pre-tax profit) n.a. 21% 36% 33,0% 33,0% 33,0% 33,0%
€ million
E.ON Capex - Key Indicators 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Property, plant and equipment 60.787 60.870 55.869 58.663 60.823 62.935 64.706
Total Capex 8.655 8.286 6.524 6.731 6.504 6.277 6.050
 % total EBITDA 67% 62% 70% 67% 55% 51% 47%
% Property, plant and Equipment 14% 14% 12% 11% 11% 10% 9%
Depreciation and amortizations
% Property, plant and Equipment 6% 6% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7%
€ million
E.ON Working capital 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Net working capital 4.708 5.299 6.068 6.091 6.143 6.315 6.488
Investment in working capital 0 591 769 23 53 172 172
Working capital (% of Sales) 5,9% 5,7% 5,4% 5,7% 5,7% 5,7% 5,7%
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4.1.2.  Discounted Cash Flows 
4.1.2.1. Free Cash Flows Estimation 
 
Below I present the Free Cash Flow to the Firm estimation for E.ON for the period of 2012-
2015, resulting from the company’s financial projections I estimated on the previous chapter.  
In addition to an explicit forecasted period, I estimated a perpetuity cash flow using the 
following assumptions: 
 Growth rate: I considered that it would be 1,9%, equal to the European Union inflation 
estimation for 2016 onwards (IMF Economic Outlook, April 2012); 
 EBIT: Equal to 2015’s estimated EBIT plus 1,9% growth, 
 Tax on EBIT: same tax rate than used on the 2011-2015 period, 
 Depreciation and Amortization: Equal to 2015’s estimated amount, 
 Capital Expenditures: Equal to 2015’s estimated amount, 
 Investment in Working Capital: Equal to 2015’s estimation plus 1,9% growth. 
 




4.1.2.2. Weighted Average Cost of Capital – WACC 
 
These are challenging times for estimating cash flow discount rates but E.ON being listed on 
the Germany stock exchange, which has a mature capital in a country benefiting from stable 
economic conditions, allowed me to use some straight forward assumptions:   
 Risk Free Rate:  2011 average Germany 10 year government bonds yield; 
 Beta: Calculation based on two years weekly observations of the relationship between 
the domestic market index DAX and E.ON’s stock quote; 
 Equity Market Risk Premium: 6% (Professor Aswath Damodaran latest estimate for 
mature capital markets); 
 Cost of Debt: Average cost of E.ON’s short-term and long-term debt during 2011.  
 Short term and long term debt amounts refer to 31-12-2011 as recorded on the 
company’s balance sheet;  
 Tax rate: Germany marginal Corporate Tax Rate. 
€ Millions
Cashflows - E.ON 2012 2013 2014 2015 Perpetuity
(+) EBIT 6.064 7.395 8.052 8.476 8.639
(-) Tax on Ebit 2.001 2.440 2.657 2.797 2.851
(+) D&A 3.937 4.345 4.165 4.279 4.279
(-) Capex 6.731 6.504 6.277 6.050 6.050
(-) Investment in WK 23 53 172 172 175
(=) Free Cash Flow to the Firm 1.245 2.742 3.111 3.736 3.842
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Considering a Debt-to-(Equity+Debt) Ratio of 49%, as of 31-12-2011, I estimate that E.ON 















4.1.2.3. Valuation – Base Case 
 
 
Considering the above mentioned assumptions, I 
estimate that E.ON equity value is circa € 63 






4.1.2.4. Scenario analysis 
I stressed E.ON’s equity valuation by using alternative perpetuity growth rates and WACC, 





It is possible to observe that both of these components used in the discounted cash flow 
methodology have a great impact on determining the company’s equity value.  
 
 
5,62% 6,12% 6,62% 5,62% 6,12% 6,62%
1,4% 64.753 55.590 48.194 1,4% 33,99 29,18 25,30
g 1,9% 74.676 63.256 54.271 g 1,9% 39,20 33,21 28,49
2,4% 87.698 72.994 61.794 2,4% 46,04 38,32 32,44
Scenario Analysis
 E.ON
Equity Value - € million
Scenario Analysis
 E.ON
Share Value - € 
WACC WACC
Wacc 6,1%
EV - explicit Period 9.157
Growth Rate 1,9%
EV - perpetuity 72.089
EV (€ million) 81.246
Financial Net Debt (€ million) 17.990
Equity value (€ million) 63.256
# of shares (million) 1.905
value per share € 33,21
Valuation - E.ON @ 31/12/2011







31/12/2011 - capital structure
Risk free rate 2,65%
Equity risk premium 6,18%
Beta 1,03
Equity Market Risk Premium 6,00%
Cost of equity = RF + β X MRP 8,83%
Pre-tax Short term cost of debt 2,50%
ST debt to total debt 20%
Pre-tax Long term cost of debt 5,47%
LT debt to total debt 80%
Pre-tax average cost of debt 4,89%
Marginal tax rate 33,00%
Cost of debt 3,27%
Wacc 6,12%
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4.1.3. Multiples Valuation 
 
In order to validate the results obtained with the DCF methodology, I also used Market and 
Transaction Multiples to value E.ON. 
 
On both cases I used operating cash flow proxy multiples that are not influenced by the 
companies’ financial structures or taxation. Namely, I selected Enterprise Value / EBITDA and 
Enterprise Value / EBIT to determine E.ON’s fundamental value. 
 
I estimated the company’s Enterprise Value using the average and median of multiples 
obtained from a selected sample of companies (additional detail can be found on the 
Annexes). To calculate E.ON’s Equity Value at 31/12/2011, I then deducted the company’s end 
of year financial net debt.  
 
4.1.3.1. Market multiples 
 
In order to obtain comparable market multiples, I used a sample of 10 international energy 
companies with diversified operations and geographies and, in most cases, with headquarters 









Using Market Multiples methodology, E.ON’s estimated Equity Value should be circa € 38 – 40 
billion, or € 20 -21 per share. 
 
When looking to these values it is important to be aware how market sentiment impacts 
valuing a company using this methodology. At the end of 2011, period that serves as reference 
for this analysis, equity markets were severely depressed which caused a reduction on implied 
market multiples. 
 
On top of that, E.ON had a series of one-off effects, related to nuclear production phasing-out 
and trading activities losses, leading to the company having the lowest EBITDA and EBIT for the 
last 3 years in 2011. 
 
 
EV/ EBITDA EV/ EBIT
Average (except E.ON) 6,4 10,7







EV based on average multiple 59.270 58.024
EV based on median multiple 56.273 54.792
Average EV 57.771 56.408
Financial Net Debt @ 31/12/2011 17.990 17.990
Equity Value @ 31/12/2011 39.781 38.418
Value per share (€) 20,88 20,17
E.ON 2011 Financial Indicators
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4.1.3.2. Transaction multiples 
 
For determining comparable transaction multiples, I used a sample of 20 transactions 
originated in the period of 2009-2011 and encompassing companies with diversified 
operations in electricity and gas (sample used can be found in the Annexes).  
 
Due to the existence of some outliers, as it can be seen on the Min-Max spread on the table 










Based on the Transaction Multiples methodology, E.ON’s Equity Value could amount to circa € 
65 – 68 billion, or € 33 -36 per share.  
 
4.1.4. Valuation Summary 
 
Below, I present the valuation summary for E.ON obtained from using the three different 













Average - Without outliers 9,08 14,89












EV based on average multiple 84.342 80.976
EV based on median multiple 80.625 90.884
Average EV 82.483 85.930
Financial Net Debt @ 31/12/2011 17.990 17.990
Equity Value @ 31/12/2011 64.493 67.940
Value per share (€) 33,85 35,66
E.ON 2011 Financial Indicators
Methodology Minimum Base Case Maximum
Discounted Cash Flow 48.194 63.256 87.698
Transaction Multiples 64.493 67.940
Market Multiples 38.418 39.781
Average 50.368 57.754 65.140
E.ON Equity Valuation Summary (€ million)
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All cases yield a valuation above E.ON’s stock price range in 2011 (chart above) which can be 
justified by investors not been fond of the Company due to the lack of growth drivers and a 
history of market underperformance.  
 
4.2. EDP Valuation 
4.2.1. EDP - Financial Projections 
Below, the reader will find Profit and Loss, Capital Expenditures and Working Capital financial 
projections for: 
 EDP Brasil, 
 EDP Renováveis, 
 EDP Iberian Business Lines. 
 
I followed a bottom-up approach for estimating EDP’s financial projections, using information 
relating to the business lines that compose each reportable segment of the Company. This 
enabled me to define detailed assumptions for estimating the company’s cash flows.  
Additionally I intended to incorporate a neutral market view that would enable me to estimate 
EDP’s unbiased fundamental value. To accomplish this purpose, I estimated EDP’s financial 
projections based on three sources of information:  
 Operating and financial historic evolution: I depicted the evolution of each reporting 
segment (by type of business and/ or geography, when available), namely relating to 
Methodology Minimum Base Case Maximum
Discounted Cash Flow 25,30 33,21 46,04
Transaction Multiples 33,85 35,66
Market Multiples 20,17 20,88
Average 26,44 30,32 34,19
E.ON Value per Share Summary (€)
Min Max Average Close








J-11 F-11 M-11 A-11 M-11 J-11 J-11 A-11 S-11 O-11 N-11 D-11
E.ON - 2011 Stock Price (€)
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growth, profitability and investment outlays (working capital and capital 
expenditures). 
 Analysts best estimates: EDP is broadly followed by financial analysts from different 
national and international investment banks and research houses. To benefit from 
this, I consulted the analyst’s consensus available on Bloomberg database regarding 
EDP’s main cash flow drivers. 
 Specific economic and market related drivers: I considered the impact of specific 
issues, such as economic downturn and expected inflation, which influence each 
business line performance depending of their particular idiosyncrasies, namely 
geography and business scopes of each business line.  
 
EDP Brasil Financial Projections 
 
EDP Brasil financial projections were estimated in the local currency, Brazilian Real. 
 
 
I estimate that EDP Brasil revenues will continue to perform annual increases of circa 7%, 2% 
above the forecasted annual inflation of 5% for Brazil in the next 4 years according to 
International Monetary Fund latest projections.  
According to the company’s management, Electricity Generation and Supply will be the bigger 
drivers for the EDP Brasil’s growth in the following years. This idea was recently restated at 
EDP Brasil investor’s day in May 2012.  
Relating to the company’s operating profitability in the next few years, recent performance 
should be a good benchmark as the company is still undergoing a growth stage but increased 
competition should limit margin upside. Therefore, I assume future operating margins will 
maintain 2011 levels.   
For estimating the company’s operating tax expenses for the financial projections time horizon 
I used the current Brazilian corporate tax rate because the company has only operations in this 
country. 
Additional detail concerning Profit and Loss main lines key indicators is displayed in the table 





Income Statement - Energias do Brasil 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Revenues 4.622 5.034 5.402 5.803 6.245 6.662 7.290
Gross Profit 2.274 2.269 2.396 2.587 2.785 2.973 3.254
Operating costs 743 697 810 916 1.006 1.089 1.128
EBITDA 1.531 1.571 1.586 1.671 1.779 1.884 2.126
Net depreciation and amortisation 329 374 325 403 425 435 492
EBIT 1.167 1.178 1.213 1.269 1.353 1.448 1.633
P&L - Energias do Brasil - Key Indicators 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Revenues Annual growth rate 9% 7% 7% 8% 7% 9%
Gross Profit - % of Revenues 49% 45% 44% 45% 45% 45% 45%
EBITDA Margin - % of Revenues 33% 31% 29% 29% 28% 28% 29%
EBIT Margin - % of Revenues 25% 23% 22% 22% 22% 22% 22%
Effective tax rate (% Pre-tax profit) 23% 26% 23% 34% 34% 34% 34%
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In order to sustain Electricity Generation and Supply activity growth, it is expected that this 
segment should be responsible for the majority of EDP Brasil’s capital expenditures in the 
2012-2015 period. 
I estimate that the company’s capital expenditures will peak in 2012 and then decrease 
annually until reaching circa R$ 664 million in 2015.  
 
 
It was assumed that the fixed assets relating to Property, Plant and Equipment would maintain 
an average useful life of circa 15 years. Therefore, the company’s depreciations should amount 




Working capital investment was estimated assuming that each year’s net working capital 
would amount to circa 3% of each year Revenues, in line with the average proportion verified 






Capex - Energias do Brasil 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Capex (net of subsidies) R$ m 714 995 792 874 800 783 664
Electricity Distribution 306 388 324 355 325 318 270
Electricity Generation and Supply 408 607 468 519 474 464 394
Maintenance 45 67 82 68 63 61 52
Expansion 363 540 386 450 412 403 342
R$ million
Capex - Energias do Brasil - Indicators 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Property, plant and equipment 4.804 5.304 5.660 6.131 6.505 6.853 7.025
Total Capex
 % total Revenues 15% 20% 15% 15% 13% 12% 9%
% Property, plant and Equipment 15% 19% 14% 14% 12% 11% 9%
Depreciation and amortizations
% Property, plant and Equipment 7% 7% 6% 7% 7% 6% 7%
R$ million
Working capital - EDP Brasil 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Net working capital 395 218 77 167 179 191 210
Investment in working capital -177 -141 90 13 12 18
Working capital (% Revenues) 8,5% 4,3% 1,4% 2,9% 2,9% 2,9% 2,9%
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EDP Renováveis Financial Projections 
 
EDP Renováveis comprises 2 business segments defined by their geographic scope: United 




Both segments are expected to increase revenues at a fast pace due to entrance in operation 
of installed, under construction and identified pipeline wind farms. Albeit the existent growth 
opportunities available to the company, I assumed that increasingly limited access to funds 
and uncertainty regarding regulatory framework of renewable energy would limit growth and 





According to the majority of analysts that follow EDP Renováveis, it is expected that operating 
profitability will increase in the next years mainly due to a stronger bet in Eastern and Central 
European countries that have favorable feed-in tariffs for wind power. 
I assumed the corporate tax rate applicable to EDP Renováveis would be 32,5%, corresponding 
to the average of the current corporate tax applied in USA and Spain, the countries were EDP 
Renováveis has most of its operations.  
It is expected that EDP Renováveis will continue to have higher investment outflows in Europe, 
not necessarily due to a disproportionate bet in this geography but because USA has a 
favorable investment scheme that reduces the company’s net capital expenditures. I assumed 
€ million
Income Statement - EDP Renováveis 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Total Revenues 725 948 1.069 1.254 1.450 1.699 1.912
Europe 436 562 635 743 853 993 1.110
US 276 378 415 494 577 682 775
Others & adjustments 12 7 19 18 20 24 27
Operating costs 182 235 268 323 370 443 460
Europe 88 101 96 137 155 186 183
US 69 93 145 142 165 198 210
Others & adjustments 25 42 28 44 51 59 68
EBITDA 543 713 801 931 1.080 1.256 1.452
Europe 348 462 539 606 698 807 927
US 207 285 271 351 412 484 565
Others & adjustments -13 -34 -9 -26 -30 -35 -41
Provisions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Net Depreciation and amortisation 312 423 454 451 479 503 528
Europe 153 208 251 232 251 267 283
US 152 210 196 212 222 231 241
Others & adjustments 7 5 6 7 6 5 4
EBIT 231 290 348 480 601 753 924
Europe 195 254 289 374 447 540 644
US 55 75 74 139 190 253 324
Others & adjustments -19 -39 -16 -33 -36 -40 -45
P&L - EDP R - Indicators 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Revenues - Annual growth rate 31% 13% 17% 16% 17% 13%
EBITDA Margin 75% 75% 75% 74% 74% 74% 76%
EBIT Margin 32% 31% 33% 38% 41% 44% 48%
Effective tax rate (% Pre-tax profit) 28% 31% 24% 32,5% 32,5% 32,5% 32,5%
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that, from 2012 onwards, the company would reduce moderately its capital expenditures to 




Regarding Depreciation estimation, I assumed that the company’s yearly Depreciation would 
be circa 4% of each year estimated Property, Plant and Equipment values, which implies an 





Working capital is estimated to amount to circa minus 1,3 times each year’s Revenues, which 







Capex - EDP Renováveis 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Europe 1.014 539 368 509 469 470 443
USA - net Capex 670 614 405 447 412 413 390
Other 6 79 56 37 34 35 33
Total 1.690 1.232 829 993 915 918 866
€ million
Capex - EDP Renováveis - Key Indicators 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Property, plant and equipment, net 8.635 9.982 10.455 11.240 11.997 12.727 13.431
Total Capex
 % total EBITDA 312% 173% 104% 107% 85% 73% 60%
% Property, Plant and Equipment 20% 12% 8% 9% 8% 7% 6%
Depreciation and amortizations
% Property, plant and Equipment 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4%
€ million
Working capital - EDP Renováveis 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Net working capital -1.209 -1.626 -1.382 -1.622 -1.876 -2.197 -2.472
Investment in working capital -417 244 -240 -254 -322 -275
Working capital (% Revenues) -167% -172% -129% -129% -129% -129% -129%
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EDP Iberian Business Lines Financial Projections 
 
EDP Iberian Business lines comprise 3 major segments: 
 Long Term Contract Generation; 
 Iberian Liberalised Activities, which include Electricity Generation, Electricity Supply 
and Gas Supply; 
 Regulated Networks Iberia, which include Electricity Distribution and Last Resort 
Supply in Portugal, Electricity Distribution in Spain and Gas Regulated Activity. 
 
Albeit EDP does not report aggregate information for its Iberian Businesses, I estimated pro-
forma projections for the Iberian Business Lines (excluding wind farms electricity generation in 
Iberia, that is included in EDP Renováveis) in order to facilitate the reader’s understanding of 
the company’s financial information. 
No disregarding additional detail the reader will find in the Annexes regarding my estimates for 
each one of the Iberian Business Lines financial projections, below I explain the main drivers 
sustaining EDP’s Iberian Business financial projections: 
 Economic context: economic outlook for Iberia is very conservative and it is expected 
to limit revenue growth; 
 Regulation: albeit it is expected that some changes in regulation may happen in the 
next couple of years in Iberia, namely regarding additional liberalization in business 
segments in which EDP operates, these changes should have a limited negative impact 
on EDP. In fact, they should focus mainly in the residential segment, which has a minor 
contribution for the company’s Iberian revenues; 
 Resilience: EDP’s Iberian business lines performance is backed by long-term asset 
based remuneration with limited correlation to changes in market prices and volumes. 
  
Revenue growth is expected to be slightly negative in 2012 and very limited in the following 
years. Liberalised Activities should perform the higher revenue growths in Iberia, although with 
more conservative growth rates than observed in previous years. 
Nevertheless, Long-Term Contract Generation and Regulated Networks should continue to be 
the biggest contributors for Iberian operating margin due to favorable contract and 
€ million
Income Statement - Iberian Business Lines 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Revenues 11.670 13.877 15.095 14.938 15.209 15.861 16.218
LT Contract Generation 1.827 1.708 2.035 1.954 1.957 2.013 2.031
Liberalised Activities Iberia 3.885 5.300 5.807 5.842 5.992 6.262 6.414
Regulated Networks Iberia 5.958 6.869 7.254 7.142 7.260 7.587 7.772
Gross Profit 3.791 3.736 3.585 3.563 3.503 3.543 3.548
LT Contract Generation 1.030 1.076 1.009 1.045 1.043 1.067 1.082
Liberalised Activities Iberia 1.018 820 769 701 652 634 616
Regulated Networks Iberia 1.744 1.840 1.807 1.818 1.808 1.842 1.850
EBITDA 2.318 2.264 2.362 2.276 2.249 2.283 2.303
LT Contract Generation 823 877 824 862 861 880 893
Liberalised Activities Iberia 666 449 392 399 374 368 363
Regulated Networks Iberia 829 939 1.145 1.015 1.014 1.035 1.046
EBIT 1.480 1.377 1.575 1.481 1.462 1.499 1.544
LT Contract Generation 560 663 615 640 637 655 673
Liberalised Activities Iberia 421 131 158 172 158 158 163
Regulated Networks Iberia 499 584 803 669 666 686 708
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€ million
Working capital -  - Iberian Business Lines - Pro-forma 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
EDP - Working Capital -4.128 -3.009 -2.003 -2.199 -2.459 -2.804 -3.087
EDP Brasil Working Capital 157 98 32 69 74 79 87
EDP Renováveis Working capital -1.209 -1.626 -1.382 -1.622 -1.876 -2.197 -2.472
Iberia - Pro-forma Working Capital -3.076 -1.481 -653 -646 -658 -686 -701
Iberia - Pro-forma Working Capital
% Iberia pro-forma Revenues -26% -11% -4% -4% -4% -4% -4%
Investment in working capital 1.595 829 7 -12 -28 -15
remuneration schemes locked by EDP in previous years. This should allow EDP Iberian Business 




It is expected that the slowdown in forecasted activity will allow the company to lower capital 
expenditures particularly in the Liberalised Activities segment. The Regulated Networks 
business is expected to continue to demand recurrent investments that are crucial to assure a 




As EDP does not report working capital for its Iberian Business Lines, I deducted EDP Brasil and 
EDP Renováveis working capital from EDP’s consolidated Working Capital to determine historic 
pro-forma Net Working Capital levels for this business segment. 
For estimating Working Capital investment for the projections period, I considered that 
working capital would amount to circa minus 4% of each year total Iberian Business Lines 
revenues. This approach results in minor working capital variations within the forecasted time 
horizon, which is consistent with the maintenance of the no upside/ no downside status quo of 
EDP’s Iberian business lines.   
   
P&L- Iberian Business Lines - Key Indicators 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Revenues - Annual Growth rate n.a. 19% 9% -1% 2% 4% 2%
LT Cont. Gen.- Annual Growth rate n.a. -7% 19% -4% 0% 3% 1%
Lib.Act.Iberia - Annual Growth rate n.a. 36% 10% 1% 3% 4% 2%
Reg. Net. Iberia- Annual Growth rate n.a. 15% 6% -2% 2% 4% 2%
EBITDA Margin - % of Revenues 20% 16% 16% 15% 15% 14% 14%
LT Cont. Gen.- EBITDA % of Revenues 45% 51% 41% 44% 44% 44% 44%
Lib.Act.Iberia - EBITDA % of Revenues 17% 8% 7% 7% 6% 6% 6%
Reg. Net. Iberia- EBITDA % of Revenues 14% 14% 16% 14% 14% 14% 13%
EBIT Margin - % of Revenues 13% 10% 10% 10% 10% 9% 10%
LT Cont. Gen.- EBIT % of Revenues 31% 39% 30% 33% 33% 33% 33%
Lib.Act.Iberia - EBIT % of Revenues 11% 2% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3%
Reg. Net. Iberia- EBIT % of Revenues 8% 8% 11% 9% 9% 9% 9%
€ million
Capex - Iberian Business Lines 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Total Capex 1.199 933 935 904 818 808 767
LT Contract Generation 128 96 59 74 75 80 82
Liberalised Activities Iberia 713 467 466 463 375 331 281
Regulated Networks Iberia 359 371 411 367 368 397 404
Capex - Iberian Business Lines - Key indicators 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Total Capex - % EBITDA 52% 41% 40% 40% 36% 35% 33%
LT Contract Generation Capex
% LT Contract Generation EBITDA 15% 11% 7% 9% 9% 9% 9%
Liberalised Activities Iberia Capex
% Liberalised Activities Iberia EBITDA 107% 104% 119% 116% 100% 90% 77%
Regulated Networks Iberia Capex
% Regulated Networks Iberia EBITDA 43% 39% 36% 36% 36% 38% 39%
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4.2.2. Discounted Cash Flows  
4.2.2.1. Free Cash Flows Estimation 
Below I present the Free Cash Flow to the Firm estimation for EDP Brasil, EDP Renováveis and 
EDP’s Iberian Business Lines for 2012-2015 according to the Financial Projections presented 
previously. 
For each segment, I additionally estimated a perpetuity cash flow using the following 
assumptions: 
 Growth rate: I considered different growth rates for each business segment in order to 
reflect their specificities; 
 EBIT: Equal to 2015’s estimated EBIT plus each segment estimated growth; 
 Tax on EBIT: same tax rate than used on the 2011-2015 period; 
 Depreciation and Amortization: Equal to 2015’s estimated amount; 
 Capital Expenditures: Equal to 2015’s estimated amount; 
 Investment in Working Capital: Equal to 2015’s estimation plus each segment 
estimated growth. 
 
These projections will be used to valuate EDP’s Equity using a Sum-of-Parts approach based on 




Considering the above mentioned assumptions and a perpetuity growth rate of 4,5%, 
(equivalent to the estimated inflation for Brasil from 2016 onwards, source IMF), EDP Brasil’s 





I assumed a perpetuity growth rate of 4% for EDP Renováveis, which is equal to the average of 
IMF’s long term growth estimations for GDP in USA, Euro Area and Eastern Europe, EDPR 
Renováveis’ main current and prospective markets. 
 
R$ Million
Cashflows - EDP Brasil 2012 2013 2014 2015 Perpetuity
(+) EBIT 1.269 1.353 1.448 1.633 1.707
(-) Tax on Ebit 431 460 492 555 580
(+) D&A 403 425 435 492 492
(-) Capex 874 800 783 664 664
(-) Investment in WK 90 13 12 18 19
(=) Free Cash Flow to the Firm 276 506 596 888 936
€ Million
Cashflows - EDP Renováveis 2012 2013 2014 2015 Perpetuity
(+) EBIT 480 601 753 924 961
(-) Tax on Ebit 156 195 245 300 312
(+) D&A 451 479 503 528 528
(-) Capex 993 915 918 866 866
(-) Investment in WK -240 -254 -322 -275 -286
(=) Free Cash Flow to the Firm 22 223 415 561 597
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EDP Iberian Business Lines 
 
I considered a perpetuity growth rate of 3,5% for Iberia, which is equal to the average GDP 
growth estimated by IMF for Portugal and Spain for 2016 onwards. 
 
 
4.2.2.2. Weighted Average Cost of Capital – WACC 
 
As one of the purposes of my thesis is to analyze if E.ON’s bid for EDP had economic reasoning, 
I intend to be as market neutral as possible. In light of this, I will use standard market 
measures to calculate each segment’s cost of capital: 
 Risk Free Rate + Country Risk Premium:  domestic government bonds yield (Brasil for 
EDP Brasil and Portugal for the remaining); 
 Beta: Calculation based on two years weekly observations of the relation between the 
respective domestic market index (Bovespa for EDP Brasil and PSI-20 for the 
remaining) and stock quotes (EDP Brasil and EDP Renováveis are listed; for Iberian 
Business Lines I used EDP’s stock quote); 
 Equity Market Risk Premium: 6% (Professor Aswath Damodaran latest estimate for 
mature capital markets); 
 Cost of Debt: Average cost of debt in 2011 for each business segment. For Iberian 
Business Lines I used EDP’s average cost of debt (this indicator is not reported by EDP 
for this business segment); 
 Debt amounts refer to 31-12-2011 as recorded on the company’s balance sheets;  
 Tax rate: current corporate marginal tax rates applicable for each segment’s main 
markets. 
 












Assuming a Debt-to-(Equity+Debt) Ratio of 35%, as of 31-12-2011, EDP Brasil WACC is 10,48%. 
 
€ Million
Cashflows - Iberian Business Lines 2012 2013 2014 2015 Perpetuity
(+) EBIT 1.481 1.462 1.499 1.544 1.599
(-) Tax on Ebit 452 446 457 471 488
(+) D&A 795 787 784 758 758
(-) Capex 904 818 808 767 767
(-) Investment in WK 69 74 79 87 90
(=) Free Cash Flow to the Firm 851 911 939 978 1.012
Risk free rate + country risk premium 10,27%
Equity risk premium 2,88%
Beta 0,48
Equity Market Risk Premium 6,00%
Cost of equity = RF + β X MRP 13,15%
Pre-tax average cost of debt 8,49%
Marginal tax rate 34,00%
Cost of debt (after tax) 5,60%
Wacc 10,48%





31/12/2011 - capital structure
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EDP Renováveis WACC 
 
I used Portuguese 10 year government bond yield as a reference for EDP Renováveis risk free 
rate + country risk premium because the company’s shareholders are mainly Portuguese (EDP 
and other private and institutional investors hold more than 80% of EDPR’s shares). 
 
I considered a marginal tax rate of 32,5% corresponding to the average of USA and Spain 
marginal corporate tax rates, as these markets are currently the biggest contributors for the 
company’s income (EDP Renováveis management estimates that the effective tax rate in the 

















EDP Iberian Business Lines WACC 
 
I used market and company data relating to EDP to estimate this business segment WACC, 
namely regarding cost of equity, pre-tax cost of debt and current Portuguese marginal 




Assuming EDP’s Debt-to-(Equity+Debt) Ratio of 68%, as of 31-12-2011, EDP Iberian Business 
Lines WACC is 7,82%. 
 
 







31/12/2011 - capital structure
Risk free rate + country risk premium 10,17%
Equity risk premium 5,40%
Beta 0,9
Equity Market Risk Premium 6,00%
Cost of equity = RF + β X MRP 15,57%
Pre-tax average cost of debt 7,02%
Marginal tax rate 32,50%
Cost of debt 4,74%
Wacc 10,36%
Risk free rate + country risk premium 10,17%
Equity risk premium 5,46%
Beta 0,91
Equity Market Risk Premium 6,00%
Cost of equity = RF + β X MRP 15,63%
Pre-tax Short term cost of debt 2,59%
ST debt to total debt 16%
Pre-tax Long term cost of debt 6,67%
LT debt to total debt 84%
Pre-tax average cost of debt 6,02%
Marginal Tax rate 30,50%
Cost of debt (after tax) 4,18%
Wacc 7,82%





31/12/2011 - capital structure
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Min Max Average Close










J-11 F-11 M-11 A-11 M-11 J-11 J-11 A-11 S-11 O-11 N-11 D-11
EDP Brasil - 2011 Stock Price (BRL)Wacc 10,5%
EV - explicit Period 1.703
Growth Rate 4,5%
EV - perpetuity 10.511
EV (BRL million) 12.215
EUR/ BRL - 31/12/2011 2,42
EV (€ million) 5.047
Financial Net Debt (€ million) 1.063
Equity value  (€ million) 3.985
% held by EDP 51%
Equity value for EDP (€ million) 2.032
# of shares (million) 159
value per share (€) 25,09
value per share (BRL) 60,72
Valuation - EDP Brasil @ 31/12/2011
Min Max Average Close












J-11 F-11 M-11 A-11 M-11 J-11 J-11 A-11 S-11 O-11 N-11 D-11
EDP Renováveis - 2011 Stock Price (€)
4.2.2.3. Valuation – Base Case 
 
EDP Brasil Valuation 
 
EDP Brasil’s Enterprise Value was calculated in Brazilian Reais and converted to Euros at the 
end of year spot rate, yielding an estimated Equity Value for EDP’s share capital amounting to 
circa € 2 billion after deducting financial net debt and accounting only the percentage of issued 





EDP Brasil’s valuation using the DCF methodology outputs an implied value per share of circa 
60,72 Brazilian Real, above the average 2011 stock price (the company is listed is Brazil stock 
exchange Bovespa). Nevertheless, it is possible to see in the chart above that the stock was 




EDP Renováveis Valuation 
 
Considering the assumptions explained on the EDP Financial Projections chapter above, I 
estimate EDP Renováveis Equity Value for EDP to be circa € 3 billion (EDP owns 77,5% of EDP 
Renováveis). 
 
EDP Renováveis’ average stock price during 2011 (€ 4,47 - chart above) is very close to the 
value per share calculated using the DCF (€ 4,40 – table above). 
 
Wacc 10,4%
EV - explicit Period 890
Growth Rate 4,0%
EV - perpetuity 6.338
EV (€ million) 7.228
Financial Net Debt (€ million) 3.387
Equity value (€ million) 3.841
% held by EDP 77,5%
Equity value for EDP (€ million) 2.977
# of shares (million) 872
value per share € 4,40
Valuation - EDP Renováveis @ 31/12/2011
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EDP Iberian Business Lines Valuation 
 
I used EDP WACC to discount EDP Iberian Business Lines projected cash flows. 
As the company does not report net debt for this business segment, I deducted EDP 




Considering all the above mentioned assumptions, I estimate an Equity Value of circa € 7,9 
billion for EDP Iberian Business Lines. 
 
 
EDP Sum-of-Parts Valuation 
 
EDP Sum-of-Parts Valuation at 31/12/2011 amounts to circa € 12,9 billion, equivalent to a 





4.2.2.4. Scenario Analysis 
 
I made scenario analysis for each business segment considering alternative perpetuity growth 
rates and WACCs, 50 basis points above and below their respective values considered in the 




Due to the complexity of the business and the multiple of assumptions needed to obtain a DCF 
valuation of EDP, it is no surprise that there is a considerable range for the company’s equity 
valuation using this methodology.  
Wacc 7,8%
EV - explicit Period 3.045
Growth Rate 3,5%
EV - perpetuity 17.377
EV (€ million) 20.423
Financial Net Debt (ex EDPR and Brasil) € M 12.498
Equity value (€ million) 7.925
Valuation - EDP Iberian Business Lines @ 31/12/2011
 € Million
Equity value - EDP Renováveis 2.977
Equity value - EDP Brasil 2.032
Equity value - Iberia 7.925
Total Equity value 12.934
# of shares (million) 3.657
value per share 3,54
Valuation - EDP Sum-of-Parts @ 31/12/2011
-0,50% Base case + 0,5% -0,50% Base case + 0,5%
-0,5% 13.441 10.598 8.258 -0,5% 3,68 2,90 2,26
g Base case 16.397 12.934 10.146 g Base case 4,48 3,54 2,77
+ 0,5% 20.177 15.836 12.439 + 0,5% 5,52 4,33 3,40
Scenario Analysis
 EDP (Sum-of-Parts)
Share Value - € 
WACC WACC
Equity Value - € million
Scenario Analysis
 EDP (Sum-of-Parts)
Master Thesis| Mergers and Acquisitions: An Energy Sector Case Study  
 
Henrique Bonfim Page 60 
 
4.2.1. Multiples Valuation 
As I am going to use EDP valuation to base the comparison between E.ON’s real bid for EDP 
and the maximum potential theoretical bid it could have made, incorporating the outputs of a 
multiples valuation is very relevant as is a sound way to assess market perception of the 
company’s potential value. 
I used the same multiples and methodologies for valuing EDP as I used previously to value 
E.ON (please see additional detail on the Annexes).  
 
4.2.1.1. Market multiples 
I used the same sample of companies I considered previously to value E.On, but for valuing 
EDP I also included E.ON in the sample of comparable companies (sample used can be found 






Using Market Multiples methodology EDP’s Equity Value should be circa € 7 – 8 billion, or € 2 -
2,2 per share.  
As mentioned previously, market multiples translate the prevailing market sentiment at the 
time of the valuation. As equity markets are globally depressed, with no exception for energy 
companies, EDP’s valuation using this methodology is quite below the company’s fundamental 
value calculated under the DCF method. 
 
4.2.1.2. Transaction multiples 
The comparable transactions I used for determining transaction multiples were the same used 
previously to value E.ON and can be found on the Annexes. The methodology followed to 
value E.ON was also maintained for EDP. 
 










EV based on average multiple 24.747 26.581
EV based on median multiple 23.579 23.719
Average EV 24.163 25.150
Financial Net Debt @ 31/12/2011 16.948 16.948
Equity Value @ 31/12/2011 7.215 8.202
Value per share (€) 1,97 2,24
EDP 2011 Financial Indicators





Average - Without outliers 9,08 14,89
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Using Transaction Multiples methodology, EDP’s Equity Value could amount to circa € 16 – 19 
billion, or € 4,5 -5,2 per share. 
 
The fact this method yields a higher valuation than obtained from DCF methodology is 
explained by EDP having higher operating margins than comparable companies but also high 
capital expenditures, which is captured by the DCF but not by the transaction multiples used. 
 
4.2.2. Valuation Summary 
 











EV based on average multiple 34.085 33.763
EV based on median multiple 32.583 37.895
Average EV 33.334 35.829
Financial Net Debt @ 31/12/2011 16.948 16.948
Equity Value @ 31/12/2011 16.386 18.881
Value per share (€) 4,48 5,16
EDP 2011 Financial Indicators
Methodology Minimum Base Case Maximum
Discounted Cash Flow 8.258 12.934 20.177
Transaction Multiples 16.386 18.881
Market Multiples 7.215 8.202
Average 10.620 13.186 15.753
EDP Equity Valuation Summary  (€ million)
Methodology Minimum Base Case Maximum
Discounted Cash Flow 2,26 3,54 5,52
Transaction Multiples 4,48 5,16
Market Multiples 1,97 2,24
Average 2,90 3,61 4,31
EDP Value per Share Summary (€)
Min Max Average Close











J-11 F-11 M-11 A-11 M-11 J-11 J-11 A-11 S-11 O-11 N-11 D-11
EDP - 2011 Stock Price (€)
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It is interesting to observe that EDP’s stock was, on average, quoted at a higher value during 
2011 than the output yield from market multiples valuation. This could indicate that, despite 
EDP’s exposure to the struggling Portuguese and Spanish economies, investors seem to 
recognize the growth potential of the Renewables and Brazil business, thus valuing the 
company at a premium over other energy companies. 
DCF valuation outputs an average EDP equity value above the one yielded from market 
multiples valuation but below transaction multiples valuation, which is a “common place”.  
All things considered, it is fairly reasonable to say that, at end of 2011 share quote levels, EDP 
could present a good investment opportunity.  
On top of that, as we saw above, transaction multiples are usually higher than market 
multiples, indicating that generally acquisitions of public companies, as is the case, are made at 
a premium over the market valuation. 
The next step of this thesis will be trying to assess what would the maximum reasonable price 
E.ON could pay to acquire EDP and compare it with the real bid E.ON made on EDP’s 
privatization. 
To make this assessment, first we have to identify and value the synergies from the business 
combination.  
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4.3. Synergies 
Synergies can come from a multitude of sources, as it is explained on my literature review. 
Access to new markets and new business lines, cost optimization and financial synergies are 
some examples, but naming them or theorizing about them is much easier than in fact 
accomplish them and realizing their potential value. 
I opted to follow a conservative approach and consider only synergies that have a solid and 
clear rational for creating value.  
I compared thoroughly the profile of both companies (detail in annex) and concluded that 
potential synergies of an acquisition of EDP by E.ON could come from two main sources: 
1) Increased profitability from EDP’s project capital expenditures, 
2) Financial synergies associated to lowering EDP’s cost of debt. 
Obviously, other synergies could be identified but given the risk of not being accomplished and 
the smaller impact they would have, I opted not to include them on this analysis. 
One could ask why I identified deal generated synergies that would only favor EDP’s operation 
and financial situation and not E.ON’s. The fact is that E.ON is much bigger than EDP and has 
already in place several cost optimization initiatives. 
From E.ON stand-point, EDP acquisition would allow access to growing markets and business 
lines, as is the case of Brazil and the renewable business. But these factors are already 
considered in EDP’s stand-alone valuation, so considered them again on this chapter would be 
duplication. 
For example, EDP has higher operating profitability than E.ON but, E.ON is about 7 times bigger 
(as to revenues) and its current management practices would probably dominate over the 
acquired target (EDP) practices. Therefore, I considered that it would be over optimistic to 
assume that the merger would contribute to an increase in E.ON’s operating profitability 
within a short to medium term time frame. 
I estimated that the two above mentioned sources of synergy could add circa € 1,3 billion to 
EDP Equity value if E.ON is the acquirer, as detailed below. 
Regarding the first synergy identified, I assumed that EDP would maintain the same level of 
projected capital expenditures but that investments would be more productive. This would be 
possible through a better allocation of invested capital and increased procurement 
capabilities.   
For estimating the impact on cash flows, I considered that EDP’s capital expenditures would 
yield an Asset Turnover (Sales/Assets) increasingly closer to EON’s forecasted Asset Turnover 
until reaching a value of 113% in 2015 (still significantly below that of EON’s - 177% in the 
same year). The impact on cash flows would then be materialized through an increase in sales 
and, consequently in EDP’s EBIT. 
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EV - explicit Period 170
Growth Rate 0,0%
EV - perpetuity 989
EV 1.159
Financial Net Debt 0
Equity value 1.159
# of shares (million) 3.657
value per share € 0,32
Impact on EDP Valuation @ 31/12/2011
 € Million
Wacc 6,1%
EV - explicit Period 187
Growth Rate 0,0%
EV - perpetuity 0
EV 187
Financial Net Debt 0
Equity value 187
# of shares (million) 3.657
value per share € 0,05
Impact on EDP Valuation @ 31/12/2011
€ Millions
Increased profitability of capex 2012 2013 2014 2015 Perpetuity
Capex 2.259 2.063 2.050 1.907 1.907
Estimated EDP asset turnover (Base case) 73% 74% 76% 78% 78%
Estimated E.ON Asset Turnover 184% 179% 177% 177%
Enhanced EDP Asset Turnover 83% 93% 103% 113% 113%
Impact on Sales (increase) 226 397 550 664 664
EDP Estimated EBIT margin 15% 15% 16% 17% 17%
(+) Impact on annual EBIT 34 60 86 110 110
(-) Increase in tax 10 18 26 34 34











I assumed that synergy cash flows should be discounted considering E.ON operating risks 
because if E.ON’s business does not continue to perform, synergies will not be generated, 




I estimate this synergy could add up 
to € 1,2 billion (€ 0,32/ per share) to 
EDP’s stand-alone value. 
 
   
 
 
Regarding the financial synergies, I assumed that EDP’s debt that matures within the period 
2012-2015 would be refinanced at a lower cost, namely equal to E.ON current cost of debt. 
Due to the high uncertainty of forecasting cost of funding nowadays, I considered only the 







A lower cost of debt could contribute 
to an additional € 0,2 billion (€ 0,05/ 
per share) to EDP’s stand-alone value, 
already considering the consequent 




Financing synergies - lower cost of debt 2012 2013 2014 2015
Estimated total net debt 17.217 17.000 16.492 15.662
Debt maturing in year 2.761 2.761 3.313 2.393
Accumulated debt matured since deal 2.761 5.522 8.836 11.229
Current cost of debt for EDP 6,0% 6,0% 6,0% 6,0%
Curent cost of debt for E.ON 4,9% 4,9% 4,9% 4,9%
Cost reduction of refinanced debt 1,1% 1,1% 1,1% 1,1%
(+) Impact on annual cost savings 31 63 100 127
(-) Increase in tax 10 19 31 39
(=) Impact on Free cash flows 22 43 70 88
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4.4. Bid: real vs. theoretical 
 
When E.ON made a bid for EDP in late 2011 there was some speculation if the interest in the 
deal had strategic motivations or if the bid was driven from political pressures by Berlin.   
For now, let’s focus on the real bid conditions, namely regarding price, and compare them with 
the maximum theoretical price they could have presented. 
On the chart below we can see a summary of EDP valuation, including potential synergies from 
E.ON acquiring EDP. 
 
The average valuation obtained using DCF and Relative Valuation (market and transaction 
multiples) is circa € 3,6 per share (marked with blue filling on the chart above). 
If we add synergies to the stand alone valuation, EDP value for E.ON would amount up to € 
3,95 per share (marked with blue dash on the chart above). 
E.ON’s real bid presented to the Portuguese Government (signaled on the chart above with a 
red line) was € 3,25 per share and had an implied premium of 32% over EDP average stock 
price in 2011.  
Despite this premium, the 7,7x EV/EBITDA multiple implicit on E.ON’s bid is significantly below 
the multiple of 9x found on comparable transactions. 
Additionally, if we account for the potential synergies, E.ON could have bid up to € 3,95 per 
share and still acquire EDP at a multiple EV/EBITDA of 8,4X, below comparable transactions. 
Regarding payment method, the theoretical scenario would point out to payment in cash as 
E.ON stocks seem undervalued (at the end of 2011 E.ON’s stock price had an implied 5,3x 
EV/EBITDA which compared to an average of plus 6x EV/EBITDA from comparable companies). 
Additionally, E.ON has low leverage and unused credit lines, so payment in cash would in fact 
be a viable option. 
On the real bid, E.ON opted to present a payment method that comprised a mix of 20% in cash 
and 80% with Iberian energy assets it hold on portfolio.  
The business combination offered some execution risk to E.ON associated to regulatory 
uncertainty and economic growth, two very important drivers for utilities revenue and 
profitability performance. Thus it is understandable the bid offered was tilted towards a 
conservative view of the future of energy markets.  
 




2011 EDP stock quote range
E.ON bid
EDP standalone  
valuation + synergies
EDP Valuation Summary (€ per share)
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5. Conclusion 
This thesis had two main goals:  
1. Share with the readers an overview of M&A key ingredients: valuation techniques, 
analysis of company and industry backgrounds and deal rationale; 
2. Assess if EON’s bid for EDP had economic reasoning and, if so, if it was made at fair 
price or if there was margin for improvement.  
Regarding the first point, it is possible to state indisputably that without previously analyzing 
thoroughly the “key ingredients” mentioned, only by chance an M&A deal could go right.  
But the conclusion is not so clear cut. Adequately executing all the “key ingredients” is a 
troublesome and challenging task. 
The Literature Review explained several valuation techniques that can be used to value 
companies (and synergies), but all of them are subject to some kind of decisions regarding 
assumptions that have to be made and, therefore, exposed to some degree of subjectivity. 
It is almost impossible to obtain consensual results amongst analysts, stakeholders and 
observers of an M&A deal regarding the “correct” value of the target. Valuation techniques are 
useful to find a reasonable interval of values for a bid but there is no undisputable bull’s-eye 
value for a bid. 
Regarding the second point, I believe that, based on the previous chapters of my thesis, it is 
reasonable to state that the business combination made perfect sense for E.ON. 
EDP fits within E.ON’s current strategy of increasing exposure to renewables and markets 
where energy demand is growing. EDP is one of the major world players in renewables and has 
a growing exposure to Brazil. 
The subject more open to discussion is to conclude if the bidding price was appropriate or if it 
was just enough to give it a go and hope for a bargain. 
All in all, E.ON’s bid was just enough not to cause embarrassment, but considering the price 
and payment conditions offered they lacked to show a real commitment in winning the bid.  
Even using conservative assumptions, I believe I showed clearly that there was room for E.ON 
to have offered a higher price than € 3,25 per share. 
E.ON could have bid as much as € 3,60 per share if they did not want to share any of the value 
of the synergies they would bring to the business combination. But E.ON bidding power could 
go as up as € 3,95, depending of the amount of synergies they would be willing to share with 
the seller, albeit E.ON being the sole responsible for the synergies identified.  
On the other hand, considering the major uncertainty of economic and financial context it is 
understandable E.ON did not want to risk too much on the deal in the midst of an economic 
and financial crisis where liquidity management can be the decisive factor for striving. 
Acquiring EDP would imply a significant financial effort that would increase the company’s 
leverage and constrain financial flexibility.  
E.ON ultimately lost the bid to China Three Gorges, who offered a price of € 3,45 for EDP 
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Income Statement - E.ON 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Sales 79.974 92.863 112.954 107.704 108.634 111.678 114.722
Generation n.a. 14.741 14.979 15.095 15.659 16.041 16.402
Renewables n.a. 1.943 2.439 2.843 3.150 3.574 3.958
Gas n.a. 21.348 23.012 24.601 27.072 29.207 31.244
Trading n.a. 47.948 70.463 61.714 57.022 56.799 56.799
Germany n.a. 36.403 37.244 37.790 39.470 40.711 41.910
Other European Countries n.a. 22.654 23.032 23.223 24.104 24.705 25.274
Russia n.a. 1.252 1.615 1.939 2.173 2.345 2.524
Group Management/Consolidation n.a. -53.426 -59.830 -59.507 -60.020 -61.702 -63.384
Operating Costs 66.999 79.517 103.661 97.704 96.894 99.461 101.967
Generation n.a. 10.984 12.865 13.055 13.311 13.769 14.106
Renewables n.a. 736 980 1.213 1.225 1.436 1.662
Gas n.a. 19.373 21.479 23.010 25.194 27.261 29.212
Trading n.a. 46.743 71.094 61.654 56.787 56.555 56.544
Germany n.a. 33.940 34.823 35.490 36.888 38.023 39.104
Other European Countries n.a. 20.071 20.773 21.091 21.650 22.115 22.582
Russia n.a. 875 1.062 1.269 1.386 1.490 1.606
Group Management/Consolidation n.a. -53.205 -59.415 -59.084 -59.551 -61.186 -62.845
EBITDA 12.975 13.346 9.293 10.000 11.739 12.217 12.755
Generation n.a. 3.757 2.114 2.040 2.348 2.272 2.296
Renewables n.a. 1.207 1.459 1.630 1.925 2.138 2.296
Gas n.a. 1.975 1.533 1.591 1.878 1.946 2.032
Trading n.a. 1.205 -631 60 235 244 255
Germany n.a. 2.463 2.421 2.300 2.583 2.688 2.806
Other European Countries n.a. 2.583 2.259 2.132 2.454 2.590 2.691
Russia n.a. 377 553 670 787 855 918
Group Management/Consolidation n.a. -221 -415 -423 -470 -516 -539
Depreciation and Amortization 3.684 3.892 3.855 3.937 4.345 4.165 4.279
Generation n.a. 990 986 961 987 936 897
Renewables n.a. 327 371 417 446 439 457
Gas n.a. 560 536 621 658 642 676
Trading n.a. 9 11 30 28 27 26
Germany n.a. 922 951 845 982 973 1.027
Other European Countries n.a. 870 768 793 915 850 877
Russia n.a. 127 155 190 247 219 240
Group Management/Consolidation n.a. 87 77 81 81 80 80
EBIT 9.291 9.454 5.438 6.064 7.395 8.052 8.476
Generation n.a. 2.767 1.128 1.079 1.361 1.337 1.399
Renewables n.a. 880 1.088 1.213 1.479 1.699 1.839
Gas n.a. 1.415 997 970 1.220 1.304 1.356
Trading n.a. 1.196 -642 30 207 217 229
Germany n.a. 1.541 1.470 1.455 1.601 1.715 1.779
Other European Countries n.a. 1.713 1.491 1.339 1.538 1.740 1.815
Russia n.a. 250 398 480 540 636 678
Group Management/Consolidation n.a. -308 -492 -503 -551 -597 -619
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P&L E.ON - Key Indicators 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Sales - Segment Contribution n.a. 100% 100,0% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Generation - % of Total Sales n.a. 16% 13,3% 14% 14% 14% 14%
Renewables - % of Total Sales n.a. 2% 2,2% 3% 3% 3% 3%
Gas - % of Total Sales n.a. 23% 20,4% 23% 25% 26% 27%
Trading - % of Total Sales n.a. 52% 62,4% 57% 52% 51% 50%
Germany - % of Total Sales n.a. 39% 33,0% 35% 36% 36% 37%
Other European Countries - % of Total Sales n.a. 24% 20,4% 22% 22% 22% 22%
Russia - % of Total Sales n.a. 1% 1,4% 2% 2% 2% 2%
Group Management/Consolidation - % of Total Sales n.a. -58% -53,0% -55% -55% -55% -55%
Sales - Annual Growth rate n.a. 16% 22% -5% 1% 3% 3%
Generation - Annual Growth Rate n.a. n.a. 2% 1% 4% 2% 2%
Renewables - Annual Growth Rate n.a. n.a. 26% 17% 11% 13% 11%
Gas - Annual Growth Rate n.a. n.a. 8% 7% 10% 8% 7%
Trading - Annual Growth Rate n.a. n.a. 47% -12% -8% 0% 0%
Germany - Annual Growth Rate n.a. n.a. 2% 1% 4% 3% 3%
Other European Countries - Annual Growth Rate n.a. n.a. 2% 1% 4% 2% 2%
Russia - Annual Growth Rate n.a. n.a. 29% 20% 12% 8% 8%
Group Management/Consolidation - Annual Growth Rate n.a. n.a. 12% -1% 1% 3% 3%
Operating Costs - % of Total Sales 84% 86% 92% 91% 89% 89% 89%
Generation - % of Segment Sales n.a. 75% 86% 86% 85% 86% 86%
Renewables - % of  Segment Sales n.a. 38% 40% 43% 39% 40% 42%
Gas - % of  Segment Sales n.a. 91% 93% 94% 93% 93% 93%
Trading - % of  Segment Sales n.a. 97% 101% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Germany - % of  Segment Sales n.a. 93% 93% 94% 93% 93% 93%
Other European Countries - % of  Segment Sales n.a. 89% 90% 91% 90% 90% 89%
Russia - % of  Segment Sales n.a. 70% 66% 65% 64% 64% 64%
Group Management/Consolidation - % of  Segment Sales n.a. -2% -2% 99% 99% 99% 99%
EBITDA Margin - % of Total Sales 16% 14% 8% 9% 11% 11% 11%
Generation - % of Segment Sales n.a. 25% 14% 14% 15% 14% 14%
Renewables - % of  Segment Sales n.a. 62% 60% 57% 61% 60% 58%
Gas - % of  Segment Sales n.a. 9% 7% 6% 7% 7% 7%
Trading - % of  Segment Sales n.a. 3% -1% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Germany - % of  Segment Sales n.a. 7% 7% 6% 7% 7% 7%
Other European Countries - % of  Segment Sales n.a. 11% 10% 9% 10% 10% 11%
Russia - % of  Segment Sales n.a. 30% 34% 35% 36% 36% 36%
Group Management/Consolidation - % of  Segment Sales n.a. 0% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1%
EBITDA Margin - Segment Contribution n.a. 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Generation - % of Total Ebitda n.a. 28% 23% 20% 20% 19% 18%
Renewables - % of Total Ebitda n.a. 9% 16% 16% 16% 18% 18%
Gas - % of Total Ebitda n.a. 15% 16% 16% 16% 16% 16%
Trading - % of Total Ebitda n.a. 9% -7% 1% 2% 2% 2%
Germany - % of Total Ebitda n.a. 18% 26% 23% 22% 22% 22%
Other European Countries - % of Total Ebitda n.a. 19% 24% 21% 21% 21% 21%
Russia - % of Total Ebitda n.a. 3% 6% 7% 7% 7% 7%
Group Management/Consolidation - % of Total Ebitda n.a. -2% -4% -4% -4% -4% -4%
EBIT Margin - % of Total Sales 12% 10% 5% 6% 7% 7% 7%
Generation - % of Segment Sales n.a. 19% 8% 7% 9% 8% 9%
Renewables - % of  Segment Sales n.a. 45% 45% 43% 47% 48% 46%
Gas - % of  Segment Sales n.a. 7% 4% 4% 5% 4% 4%
Trading - % of  Segment Sales n.a. 2% -1% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Germany - % of  Segment Sales n.a. 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4%
Other European Countries - % of  Segment Sales n.a. 8% 6% 6% 6% 7% 7%
Russia - % of  Segment Sales n.a. 20% 25% 25% 25% 27% 27%
Group Management/Consolidation - % of  Segment Sales n.a. 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1%
EBIT Margin - Segment Contribution 0% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Generation - % of Total Ebit n.a. 29% 21% 18% 18% 17% 17%
Renewables - % of Total Ebit n.a. 9% 20% 20% 20% 21% 22%
Gas - % of Total Ebit n.a. 15% 18% 16% 17% 16% 16%
Trading - % of Total Ebit n.a. 13% -12% 1% 3% 3% 3%
Germany - % of Total Ebit n.a. 16% 27% 24% 22% 21% 21%
Other European Countries - % of Total Ebit n.a. 18% 27% 22% 21% 22% 21%
Russia - % of Total Ebit n.a. 3% 7% 8% 7% 8% 8%
Group Management/Consolidation - % of Total Ebit n.a. -3% -9% -8% -7% -7% -7%
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E.ON Capex - Key Indicators 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Property, plant and equipment 60.787 60.870 55.869 58.663 60.823 62.935 64.706
Total Capex 8.655 8.286 6.524 6.731 6.504 6.277 6.050
 % total sales 11% 9% 6% 6% 6% 6% 5%
 % total EBITDA 67% 62% 70% 67% 55% 51% 47%
% Property, plant and Equipment 14% 14% 12% 11% 11% 10% 9%
Depreciation and amortizations
% Property, plant and Equipment 6% 6% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7%
Weight per area
Generation - % of total D&A 25% 26% 24% 23% 22% 21%
Renewables - % of total D&A 8% 10% 11% 10% 11% 11%
Gas - % of total D&A 14% 14% 16% 15% 15% 16%
Trading - % of total D&A 0% 0% 1% 1% 1% 1%
Germany - % of total D&A 24% 25% 21% 23% 23% 24%
Other European Countries - % of total D&A 22% 20% 20% 21% 20% 20%
Russia - % of total D&A 3% 4% 5% 6% 5% 6%
Group Management/Consolidation - % of total D&A 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2%
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Income Statement - Energias do Brasil 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Revenues 4.622 5.034 5.402 5.803 6.245 6.662 7.290
Electricity Distribution 3.446 3.763 3.929 4.227 4.536 4.825 5.265
Electricity Generation and Supply 1.747 1.752 2.025 2.197 2.377 2.550 2.805
Others & adjustments -571 -480 -552 -621 -668 -713 -780
Gross Profit 2.274 2.269 2.396 2.587 2.785 2.973 3.254
Electricity Distribution 1.383 1.402 1.437 1.547 1.660 1.766 1.926
Electricity Generation and Supply 832 832 910 988 1.069 1.146 1.261
Others & adjustments 59 35 48 53 57 61 66
Operating costs 743 697 810 916 1.006 1.089 1.128
Electricity Distribution 553 524 637 678 740 795 836
Electricity Generation and Supply 109 100 95 149 173 194 182
Others & adjustments 81 74 78 88 94 100 111
EBITDA 1.531 1.571 1.586 1.671 1.779 1.884 2.126
Electricity Distribution 830 878 801 868 920 970 1.090
Electricity Generation and Supply 723 732 815 839 896 953 1.080
Others & adjustments -22 -39 -30 -35 -37 -39 -44
Provisions 36 19 48 0 0 0 0
Net depreciation and amortisation 329 374 325 403 425 435 492
Electricity Distribution 176 188 207 225 237 243 273
Electricity Generation and Supply 140 152 156 176 187 191 218
Others & adjustments 13 34 -38 2 2 2 1
EBIT 1.167 1.178 1.213 1.269 1.353 1.448 1.633
Electricity Distribution 643 683 551 643 683 728 817
Electricity Generation and Supply 582 578 652 663 709 762 862
Others & adjustments -58 -84 10 -37 -39 -41 -46
P&L - Energias do Brasil - Key Indicators 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Revenues
Total - Annual Growth rate 9% 7% 7% 8% 7% 9%
Electricity Distribution - Annual Growth rate 9% 4% 8% 7% 6% 9%
Elect. Gen. and Supply - Annual Growth rate 0% 16% 8% 8% 7% 10%
Others & adjustments (% of Total Revenues) -12% -10% -10% -11% -11% -11% -11%
Gross Profit - % of Revenues
Total 45% 44% 45% 45% 45% 45%
Electricity Distribution 37% 37% 37% 37% 37% 37%
Elect. Gen. and Supply 48% 45% 45% 45% 45% 45%
Others & adjustments -10% -7% -9% -8% -9% -9% -9%
EBITDA Margin
Total (% Revenues) 33% 31% 29% 29% 28% 28% 29%
E. Distribution  (% E. Distribution Revenues) 24% 23% 20% 21% 20% 20% 21%
E. Gen & Supply  (% Gen & Supply Revenues) 41% 42% 40% 38% 38% 37% 38%
EBIT Margin
Total (% Revenues) 25% 23% 22% 22% 22% 22% 22%
E. Distribution  (% E. Distribution Revenues) 19% 18% 14% 15% 15% 15% 16%
E. Gen & Supply  (% Gen & Supply Revenues) 33% 33% 32% 30% 30% 30% 31%
Effective tax rate (% Pre-tax profit) 23% 26% 23% 34% 34% 34% 34%
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Capex - Energias do Brasil - Indicators 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Property, plant and equipment 4.804 5.304 5.660 6.131 6.505 6.853 7.025
Total Capex
 % total Revenues 15% 20% 15% 15% 13% 12% 9%
% Property, plant and Equipment 15% 19% 14% 14% 12% 11% 9%
Electricity Distribution Capex
 % Electricity Distribution Revenues 9% 10% 8% 8% 7% 7% 5%
% Property, plant and Equipment 6% 7% 6% 6% 5% 5% 4%
Electricity Generation and Supply
 % Electr.Gen. and Supply Revenues 23% 35% 23% 24% 20% 18% 14%
% Property, plant and Equipment 8% 11% 8% 8% 7% 7% 6%
Maint. Capex (% El. Gen. & Supply Capex) 11% 11% 18% 13% 13% 13% 13%
Expans. Capex (% El. Gen. & Supply Capex) 89% 89% 82% 87% 87% 87% 87%
Depreciation and amortizations
% Property, plant and Equipment 7% 7% 6% 7% 7% 6% 7%
Weight per area
Electricity Distribution 54% 50% 64% 56% 56% 56% 55%
Electricity Generation and Supply 42% 41% 48% 44% 44% 44% 44%
Others & adjustments 4% 9% -12% 0% 0% 0% 0%
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P&L - EDP R - Indicators 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Revenues
Total - Annual Growth rate n.a. 31% 13% 17% 16% 17% 13%
Europe - Annual Growth rate n.a. 29% 13% 17% 15% 16% 12%
US - Annual Growth rate n.a. 37% 10% 19% 17% 18% 14%
Others & adjustments (% of Total Revenues) 2% 1% 2% 1% 1% 1% 1%
EBITDA Margin
Total (% Revenues) 75% 75% 75% 74% 74% 74% 76%
Europe  (% Europe Revenues) 80% 82% 85% 82% 82% 81% 84%
US  (% US Revenues) 75% 75% 65% 71% 71% 71% 73%
EBIT Margin
Total (% Revenues) 32% 31% 33% 38% 41% 44% 48%
Europe  (% Europe Revenues) 45% 45% 45% 50% 52% 54% 58%
US  (% US Revenues) 20% 20% 18% 28% 33% 37% 42%
Effective tax rate (% Pre-tax profit) 28% 31% 24% 32,5% 32,5% 32,5% 32,5%
€ million
Capex - EDP Renováveis - Key Indicators 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Property, plant and equipment, net 8.635 9.982 10.455 11.240 11.997 12.727 13.431
Total Capex
 % total Revenues 233% 130% 78% 79% 63% 54% 45%
 % total EBITDA 312% 173% 104% 107% 85% 73% 60%
% Property, Plant and Equipment 20% 12% 8% 9% 8% 7% 6%
Europe Capex
 % Europe Revenues 232% 96% 58% 68% 55% 47% 40%
% Property, plant and Equipment 12% 5% 4% 5% 4% 4% 3%
US
 % US Revenues 243% 162% 98% 91% 71% 61% 50%
% Property, plant and Equipment 8% 6% 4% 4% 3% 3% 3%
Depreciation and amortizations
% Property, plant and Equipment 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4%
Weight per area
Europe 49% 49% 55% 51% 52% 53% 54%
US 49% 50% 43% 47% 46% 46% 46%
Others & adjustments 2% 1% 1% 2% 1% 1% 1%
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Income Statement - Iberian Business Lines 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Revenues 11.670 13.877 15.095 14.938 15.209 15.861 16.218
LT Contract Generation 1.827 1.708 2.035 1.954 1.957 2.013 2.031
Liberalised Activities Iberia 3.885 5.300 5.807 5.842 5.992 6.262 6.414
Regulated Networks Iberia 5.958 6.869 7.254 7.142 7.260 7.587 7.772
Gross Profit 3.791 3.736 3.585 3.563 3.503 3.543 3.548
LT Contract Generation 1.030 1.076 1.009 1.045 1.043 1.067 1.082
Liberalised Activities Iberia 1.018 820 769 701 652 634 616
Regulated Networks Iberia 1.744 1.840 1.807 1.818 1.808 1.842 1.850
Operating costs 1.473 1.472 1.224 1.287 1.254 1.260 1.245
LT Contract Generation 206 200 185 182 182 187 189
Liberalised Activities Iberia 352 371 377 301 278 266 252
Regulated Networks Iberia 915 901 662 804 794 807 804
EBITDA 2.318 2.264 2.362 2.276 2.249 2.283 2.303
LT Contract Generation 823 877 824 862 861 880 893
Liberalised Activities Iberia 666 449 392 399 374 368 363
Regulated Networks Iberia 829 939 1.145 1.015 1.014 1.035 1.046
Provisions 61 97 -31 0 0 0 0
Net depreciation 778 790 817 795 787 784 758
LT Contract Generation 263 216 212 222 224 225 220
Liberalised Activities Iberia 198 225 256 228 216 210 201
Regulated Networks Iberia 318 349 349 346 348 349 338
EBIT 1.480 1.377 1.575 1.481 1.462 1.499 1.544
LT Contract Generation 560 663 615 640 637 655 673
Liberalised Activities Iberia 421 131 158 172 158 158 163
Regulated Networks Iberia 499 584 803 669 666 686 708
P&L- Iberian Business Lines - Key Indicators 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Revenues - Annual Growth rate n.a. 19% 9% -1% 2% 4% 2%
LT Cont. Gen.- Annual Growth rate n.a. -7% 19% -4% 0% 3% 1%
Lib.Act.Iberia - Annual Growth rate n.a. 36% 10% 1% 3% 4% 2%
Reg. Net. Iberia- Annual Growth rate n.a. 15% 6% -2% 2% 4% 2%
Gross Profit - % of Revenues 32% 27% 24% 24% 23% 22% 22%
LT Cont. Gen.- % of segment revenues 56% 63% 50% 53% 53% 53% 53%
Lib.Act.Iberia -  % of segment revenues 26% 15% 13% 12% 11% 10% 10%
Reg. Net. Iberia-  % of segment revenues 29% 27% 25% 25% 25% 24% 24%
Gross Profit - Segment Contribution 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
LT Cont. Gen.- % of Total Gross Profit 27% 29% 28% 29% 30% 30% 31%
Lib.Act.Iberia -  % of Total Gross Profit 27% 22% 21% 20% 19% 18% 17%
Reg. Net. Iberia-  % of Total Gross Profit 46% 49% 50% 51% 52% 52% 52%
EBITDA Margin - % of Revenues 20% 16% 16% 15% 15% 14% 14%
LT Cont. Gen.- EBITDA % of Revenues 45% 51% 41% 44% 44% 44% 44%
Lib.Act.Iberia - EBITDA % of Revenues 17% 8% 7% 7% 6% 6% 6%
Reg. Net. Iberia- EBITDA % of Revenues 14% 14% 16% 14% 14% 14% 13%
EBIT Margin - % of Revenues 13% 10% 10% 10% 10% 9% 10%
LT Cont. Gen.- EBIT % of Revenues 31% 39% 30% 33% 33% 33% 33%
Lib.Act.Iberia - EBIT % of Revenues 11% 2% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3%
Reg. Net. Iberia- EBIT % of Revenues 8% 8% 11% 9% 9% 9% 9%
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Capex - Iberian Business Lines - Key indicators 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Total Capex
% Revenues 10% 7% 6% 6% 5% 5% 5%
% EBITDA 52% 41% 40% 40% 36% 35% 33%
LT Contract Generation Capex
% LT Contract Generation Revenues 7% 6% 3% 4% 4% 4% 4%
% LT Contract Generation EBITDA 15% 11% 7% 9% 9% 9% 9%
Liberalised Activities Iberia Capex
% Liberalised Activities Iberia Revenues 18% 9% 8% 8% 6% 5% 4%
% Liberalised Activities Iberia EBITDA 107% 104% 119% 116% 100% 90% 77%
Regulated Networks Iberia Capex
% Regulated Networks Iberia Revenues 6% 5% 6% 5% 5% 5% 5%
% Regulated Networks Iberia EBITDA 43% 39% 36% 36% 36% 38% 39%
€ million
Income Statement - LT Contract Generation 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Gross Profit 1.030 1.076 1.009 1.045 1.043 1.067 1.082
PPA/CMEC 946 962 900 915 894 894 882
Special Regime 84 114 109 130 148 173 200
Operating costs 206 200 185 182 182 187 189
EBITDA 823 877 824 862 861 880 893
Provisions 1 -3 -2 0 0 0 0
Net depreciation 263 216 212 222 224 225 220
EBIT 560 663 615 640 637 655 673
P&L LT Contract Generation - Key Indicators 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Gross Profit - Annual Growth rate 5% -6% 4% 0% 2% 1%
PPA/CMEC - Annual Growth rate 2% -6% 2% -2% 0% -1%
Special Regime- Annual Growth rate 36% -6% 19% 14% 17% 15%
Operating Costs - % of gross profit 20% 19% 18% 17% 17% 18% 17%
EBITDA Margin - % of gross profit 80% 81% 82% 83% 83% 82% 83%
EBIT Margin - % of gross profit 54% 62% 61% 61% 61% 61% 62%
€ million
Capex - LT Contract Generation 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
PPA/ CMEC Generation 84 80 48 61 61 66 67
Hydro recurrent 21 23 26 22 22 24 25
Thermal recurrent 36 22 6 13 13 14 15
Non recurrent (environmental) 27 35 17 25 26 28 28
Special Regime 44 16 11 13 13 14 15
Expansion 36 12 2 7 7 7 7
Maintenance 8 4 9 7 7 7 7
Total 128 96 59 74 75 80 82
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LT Contract Generation Capex - Key indicators 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
PPA/ CMEC Generation Capex
% PPA/ CMEC Generation Gross Profit 9% 8% 5% 6% 6% 6% 6%
Annual growth n.a. -5% -40% 27% 0% 8% 2%
Hydro recurrent
Annual growth n.a. 9% 11% -12% 0% 8% 2%
% of PPA/CMEC Capex 25% 29% 53% 37% 37% 37% 37%
Thermal recurrent
Annual growth n.a. -39% -73% 128% 0% 8% 2%
% of PPA/CMEC Capex 43% 27% 12% 22% 22% 22% 22%
Non recurrent (environmental)
Annual growth n.a. -66% -87% 319% 0% 8% 2%
% of PPA/CMEC Capex 43% 15% 3% 42% 42% 42% 42%
Special Regime Capex
% Special Regime Gross Profit 52% 14% 10% 10% 9% 8% 7%
Annual growth n.a. -63% -33% 24% 0% 8% 2%
Expansion
Annual growth n.a. -66% -87% 319% 0% 8% 2%
% of Special Regime Capex 83% 76% 15% 50% 50% 50% 50%
Maintenance
Annual growth n.a. -49% 136% -28% 0% 8% 2%
% of Special Regime Capex 17% 24% 85% 50% 50% 50% 50%
Total Capex
% Gross Profit 12% 9% 6% 7% 7% 8% 8%
Annual growth n.a. -25% -39% 27% 0% 8% 2%
€ million
Income Statement - Liberalised Activities Iberia 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Gross Profit 1.018 820 769 701 652 634 616
Electricity Generation 676 474 486 439 414 412 410
Portugal 253 172 146 126 117 116 115
Spain 441 293 350 317 300 300 299
Adjustments -18 9 -10 -4 -4 -4 -4
Electricity Supply 246 273 206 191 175 164 151
Gas Supply 95 73 77 71 64 59 54
Operating costs 352 371 377 301 278 266 252
EBITDA 666 449 392 399 374 368 363
Provisions 46 93 -22 0 0 0 0
Net Depreciation and amortisation 198 225 256 228 216 210 201
EBIT 421 131 158 172 158 158 163
P&L - Liberalised Activities Iberia -Key Indicators 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Gross Profit - Annual Growth rate n.a. -19% -6% -9% -7% -3% -3%
Operating Costs - % of gross profit 35% 45% 49% 43% 43% 42% 41%
EBITDA Margin - % of gross profit 65% 55% 51% 57% 57% 58% 59%
EBIT Margin - % of gross profit 41% 16% 21% 25% 24% 25% 26%
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Capex - Liberalised Activities Iberia 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Electricity Generation 695 453 451 449 361 316 266
% Gross Profit 103% 96% 93% 102% 87% 77% 65%
Annual growth -35% -1% 0% -20% -12% -16%
Electricity and Gas Supply 17 14 15 14 14 15 15
% Gross Profit 5% 4% 5% 5% 6% 7% 7%
Annual growth -21% 10% -8% 0% 8% 2%
Total 713 467 466 463 375 331 281
% Gross Profit 70% 57% 61% 66% 57% 52% 46%
Annual growth -35% 0% 0% -19% -12% -15%
€ million
Income Statement - Electricity Generation 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Gross Profit 676 474 486 439 414 412 410
Portugal 253 172 146 126 117 116 115
Spain 441 293 350 317 300 300 299
Adjustments -18 9 -10 -4 -4 -4 -4
Operating costs 124 116 123 103 97 97 96
EBITDA 552 358 363 336 316 315 314
Provisions 25 32 -4 0 0 0 0
Net Depreciation and amortisation 178 204 234 210 200 196 188
EBIT 349 122 133 125 116 119 126
P&L - Electricity Generation - Key Indicators 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Gross Profit - Annual Growth rate n.a. -30% 3% -10% -6% 0% 0%
Gross Profit Portugal - Annual Growth rate n.a. -32% -15% -14% -7% -1% -1%
Gross Profit Spain- Annual Growth rate n.a. -34% 20% -10% -5% 0% 0%
Gross Profit Adjustments - % total gross profit -3% 2% -2% -1% -1% -1% -1%
Operating Costs - % of gross profit 18% 24% 25% 24% 24% 24% 23%
EBITDA Margin - % of gross profit 82% 76% 75% 76% 76% 76% 77%
EBIT Margin - % of gross profit 52% 26% 27% 29% 28% 29% 31%
€ million
Capex - Electricity Generation 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Expansion 648 390 412 413 324 276 224
CCGT 246 84 0 42 42 46 47
Hydro 402 306 412 371 282 230 177
Maintenance 47 63 39 50 51 55 57
Recurrent 49 64 39 50 51 55 57
Non recurrent (environmental) -1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 695 453 451 463 375 331 281
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Capex - Electricity Generation - Indicators 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Expansion Capex
% Gross Profit 96% 82% 85% 94% 78% 67% 55%
Annual growth n.a. -40% 6% 0% -22% -15% -19%
CCGT Expansion Capex
% Gross Profit 36% 18% 0% 10% 10% 11% 12%
Annual growth n.a. -66% -100% n.a. 1% 9% 3%
Hydro Expansion Capex
% Gross Profit 59% 64% 85% 85% 68% 56% 43%
Annual growth n.a. -24% 35% -10% -24% -18% -23%
Maintenance Capex
% Gross Profit 7% 13% 8% 11% 12% 13% 14%
Annual growth n.a. 34% -39% 30% 1% 9% 3%
Recurrent Maintenance Capex
% Gross Profit 7% 13% 8% 11% 12% 13% 14%
Annual growth n.a. 31% -39% 30% 1% 9% 3%
Non-Recurrent Maintenance Capex
% Gross Profit 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Annual growth n.a. -77% -100% n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
€ million
Income Statement - Electricity Supply 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Gross Profit 246 273 206 191 175 164 151
Operating costs 192 215 220 167 153 144 133
EBITDA 55 58 -14 23 22 20 19
Provisions 21 25 -5 0 0 0 0
Net Depreciation and amortisation 20 21 21 9 8 7 7
EBIT 14 13 -31 15 14 12 12
P&L - Electricity Supply - Key Indicators 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Gross Profit - Annual Growth rate n.a. 11% -25% -7% -8% -6% -8%
Operating Costs - % of gross profit 78% 79% 107% 88% 88% 88% 88%
EBITDA Margin - % of gross profit 22% 21% -7% 12% 12% 12% 12%
EBIT Margin - % of gross profit 6% 5% -15% 8% 8% 8% 8%
€ million
Income Statement - Gas Supply 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Gross Profit 95 73 77 71 64 59 54
Operating costs 36 41 34 31 28 26 23
EBITDA 59 32 43 40 36 33 30
Provisions 0 37 -13 0 0 0 0
Net Depreciation and amortisation 1 1 1 8 8 7 6
EBIT 59 -5 56 32 29 26 24
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P&L- Gas Supply - Key Indicators 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Gross Profit - Annual Growth rate n.a. -24% 6% -9% -10% -8% -9%
Operating Costs - % of gross profit 38% 56% 44% 43% 43% 43% 43%
EBITDA Margin - % of gross profit 62% 44% 56% 57% 57% 57% 57%
EBIT Margin - % of gross profit 61% -7% 72% 45% 45% 45% 45%
€ million
Capex - Electricity and Gas Supply - Iberia 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Capex 17 14 15 14 14 15 15
% Gross Profit 5% 4% 5% 5% 6% 7% 7%
Annual growth 0% -21% 10% -8% 0% 8% 2%
€ million
Income Statement - Regulated Networks Iberia 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Gross Profit 1.744 1.840 1.807 1.818 1.808 1.842 1.850
Operating costs 915 901 662 804 794 807 804
EBITDA 829 939 1.145 1.015 1.014 1.035 1.046
Provisions 13 6 -7 0 0 0 0
Net depreciation and amortisation 318 349 349 346 348 349 338
EBIT 499 584 803 669 666 686 708
P&L Regulated Networks Iberia - Key Indicators 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Gross Profit - Annual Growth rate n.a. 5% -2% 1% -1% 2% 0%
Operating Costs - % of gross profit 52% 49% 37% 44% 44% 44% 43%
EBITDA Margin - % of gross profit 48% 51% 63% 56% 56% 56% 57%
EBIT Margin - % of gross profit 29% 32% 44% 37% 37% 37% 38%
€ million
Capex - Regulated Networks Iberia 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Capex (net of subsidies) 359 371 411 367 368 397 404
% Gross Profit 21% 20% 23% 20% 20% 22% 22%
Annual growth n.a. 3% 11% -11% 0% 8% 2%
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Income Statement - Elect. Distrib. & Last Resort Supply in Pt2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Gross Profit 1.345 1.341 1.296 1.290 1.269 1.278 1.269
Operating costs 778 778 645 674 663 669 663
EBITDA 567 563 651 616 606 608 606
Provisions 7 5 -2 0 0 0 0
Net depreciation and amortisation 242 243 245 237 235 233 223
EBIT 318 315 408 379 371 375 383
P&L - Elect. Dis.. & L.Resort Sup. Pt - Key Indicators 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Gross Profit - Annual Growth rate 0% -3% 0% -2% 1% -1%
Operating Costs - % of gross profit 58% 58% 50% 52% 52% 52% 52%
EBITDA Margin - % of gross profit 42% 42% 50% 48% 48% 48% 48%
EBIT Margin - % of gross profit 24% 23% 31% 29% 29% 29% 30%
€ million
Capex - Elect. Distrib. & Last Resort Supply in Pt 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Capex (net of subsidies) 236 239 272 240 241 260 265
% Gross Profit 18% 18% 21% 19% 19% 20% 21%
Annual growth 1% 14% -12% 0% 8% 2%
€ million
Income Statement - Elect. Distrib. in Spain 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Gross Profit 179 184 179 182 183 187 190
Operating costs 75 49 -47 59 59 61 61
EBITDA 104 135 227 123 123 127 128
Provisions 5 1 -4 0 0 0 0
Net depreciation and amortisation 31 33 35 35 35 36 35
EBIT 68 101 196 88 88 91 93
P&L - Elect. Distrib. in Spain - Key Indicators 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Gross Profit - Annual Growth rate n.a. 3% -2% 1% 0% 3% 1%
Operating Costs - % of gross profit 42% 26% -26% 32% 32% 32% 32%
EBITDA Margin - % of gross profit 58% 74% 126% 68% 68% 68% 68%
EBIT Margin - % of gross profit 38% 55% 109% 48% 48% 49% 49%
€ million
Capex - Electricity Distribution in Spain 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Capex (net of subsidies) € m 44 40 61 47 47 51 52
% Gross Profit 25% 22% 34% 26% 26% 27% 27%
Annual growth n.a. -10% 52% -23% 0% 8% 2%
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Income Statement - Gas regulated activity 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Gross Profit 220 315 332 346 357 377 392
Portugal 40 64 74 77 79 84 87
Spain 180 251 258 269 278 293 305
Operating costs 62 74 64 70 72 77 79
Portugal 19 16 19 18 19 20 21
Spain 43 59 46 52 54 57 59
EBITDA 158 241 268 276 285 300 312
Portugal 21 48 55 59 61 64 67
Spain 137 193 213 217 224 236 246
Provisions 1 1 -1 0 0 0 0
Net depreciation and amortisation 45 72 70 74 77 80 80
Portugal 11 11 13 13 14 14 14
Spain 34 61 57 61 63 66 66
EBIT 113 168 199 202 208 220 232
Portugal 9 36 44 46 47 50 52
Spain 103 132 156 156 161 170 180
P&L - Gas regulated activity - Key Indicators 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Total Gross Profit - Annual Growth rate n.a. 43% 5% 4% 3% 5% 4%
Portugal Gross Profit - Annual Growth rate n.a. 60% 16% 4% 3% 5% 4%
Spain Gross Profit - Annual Growth rate n.a. 39% 3% 4% 3% 5% 4%
Total Operating Costs - % of total gross profit 28% 24% 19% 20% 20% 20% 20%
Portugal Operating Costs - % of gross profit 47% 24% 25% 24% 24% 24% 24%
Spain Operating Costs - % of gross profit 24% 23% 18% 19% 19% 19% 19%
Total EBITDA Margin - % of total gross profit 72% 76% 81% 80% 80% 80% 80%
Portugal EBITDA Margin - % of gross profit 53% 76% 75% 76% 76% 76% 76%
Spain EBITDA Margin - % of gross profit 76% 77% 82% 81% 81% 81% 81%
Total EBIT Margin - % of gross profit 51% 53% 60% 58% 58% 58% 59%
Total Portugal EBIT Margin - % of gross profit 23% 57% 59% 59% 59% 59% 60%
Total Spain EBIT Margin - % of gross profit 57% 53% 60% 58% 58% 58% 59%
€ million
Capex - Gas regulated activity 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Capex (net of subsidies) 78 91 78 80 80 86 88
% Gross Profit 35% 29% 23% 23% 22% 23% 22%
Annual growth n.a. 17% -15% 2% 0% 8% 2%
Portugal 34 40 37 36 36 39 39
% Gross Profit 85% 63% 51% 46% 45% 46% 45%
Annual growth n.a. 18% -6% -4% 0% 8% 2%
Spain 44 51 41 44 44 47 48
% Gross Profit 24% 20% 16% 16% 16% 16% 16%
Annual growth n.a. 17% -21% 8% 0% 8% 2%
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P&L Statement - EDP Consolidated Pro-Forma 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Sales 12.198 14.171 15.121 15.702 16.251 17.158 17.857
Iberia 11.670 13.877 15.095 14.938 15.209 15.861 16.218
LT Contract Generation 1.827 1.708 2.035 1.954 1.957 2.013 2.031
Liberalised Activities Iberia 3.885 5.300 5.807 5.842 5.992 6.262 6.414
Regulated Networks Iberia 5.958 6.869 7.254 7.142 7.260 7.587 7.772
Wind Power 642 841 957 1.254 1.450 1.699 1.912
Brazil 1.680 2.148 2.313 2.398 2.580 2.753 3.012
Other -1.794 -2.694 -3.244 -2.888 -2.989 -3.156 -3.284
Gross Profit 5.105 5.404 5.436 5.630 5.838 6.188 6.507
Iberia 3.791 3.736 3.585 3.563 3.503 3.543 3.548
LT Contract Generation 1.030 1.076 1.009 1.045 1.043 1.067 1.082
Liberalised Activities Iberia 1.018 820 769 701 652 634 616
Regulated Networks Iberia 1.744 1.840 1.807 1.818 1.808 1.842 1.850
Wind Power 725 948 1.069 1.254 1.450 1.699 1.912
Brazil 818 974 1.028 1.069 1.151 1.228 1.345
Other/ Consolidation Adjustments -229 -253 -246 -257 -267 -283 -297
Ebitda 3.363 3.613 3.756 3.836 4.000 4.249 4.560
Iberia 2.318 2.264 2.362 2.276 2.249 2.283 2.303
LT Contract Generation 823 877 824 862 861 880 893
Liberalised Activities Iberia 666 449 392 399 374 368 363
Regulated Networks Iberia 829 939 1.145 1.015 1.014 1.035 1.046
Wind Power 543 713 801 931 1.080 1.256 1.452
Brazil 551 674 681 691 735 778 878
Other/ Consolidation Adjustements -49 -37 -88 -62 -64 -68 -73
Provisions 75 104 1 0 0 0 0
Net depreciation and amortisation 1.319 1.447 1.488 1.507 1.537 1.565 1.589
Iberia 778 790 817 795 787 784 758
LT Contract Generation 263 216 212 222 224 225 220
Liberalised Activities Iberia 198 225 256 228 216 210 201
Regulated Networks Iberia 318 349 349 346 348 349 338
Wind Power 312 423 454 451 479 503 528
Brazil 118 161 139 166 176 180 203
Other/ Consolidation Adjustments 111 73 77 94 96 97 99
EBIT 1.970 2.063 2.267 2.330 2.462 2.685 2.971
Iberia 1.480 1.377 1.575 1.481 1.462 1.499 1.544
LT Contract Generation 560 663 615 640 637 655 673
Liberalised Activities Iberia 421 131 158 172 158 158 163
Regulated Networks Iberia 499 584 803 669 666 686 708
Wind Power 231 290 348 480 601 753 924
Brazil 420 505 521 524 559 598 675
Other -161 -110 -176 -155 -160 -166 -172
Capital gains/(losses) 60 61 21 0 0 0 0
Financial Results -487 -485 -715 -700 -701 -687 -659
Results from associated companies 25 23 20 20 20 20 20
Pre-tax Profit 1.568 1.662 1.592 1.649 1.780 2.017 2.331
Income taxes 400 427 260 503 543 615 711
Net Profit for the period 1.168 1.235 1.332 1.146 1.237 1.402 1.620
Net profit attributable to EDP Shareholders 1.024 1.079 1.125 968 1.045 1.184 1.368
Minority Interests 144 156 207 178 192 218 252
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P&L  Indicators - EDP Consolidated 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Sales - Annual Growth 16% 7% 4% 3% 6% 4%
Iberia 19% 9% -1% 2% 4% 2%
LT Contract Generation - annual growth -7% 19% -4% 0% 3% 1%
Liberalised Activities Iberia - annual growth 36% 10% 1% 3% 4% 2%
Regulated Networks Iberia - annual growth 15% 6% -2% 2% 4% 2%
Wind Power  - annual growth 31% 14% 31% 16% 17% 13%
Brazil  - annual growth 28% 8% 4% 8% 7% 9%
Other - annual growth 50% 20% -11% 3% 6% 4%
Sales - segment contribution
Iberia 96% 98% 100% 95% 94% 92% 91%
LT Contract Generation - % of total Revenues 15% 12% 13% 12% 12% 12% 11%
Liberalised Activities Iberia -  % of total Revenues 32% 37% 38% 37% 37% 36% 36%
Regulated Networks Iberia -  % of total Revenues 49% 48% 48% 45% 45% 44% 44%
Wind Power  -  % of total Revenues 5% 6% 6% 8% 9% 10% 11%
Brazil  -  % of total Revenues 14% 15% 15% 15% 16% 16% 17%
Other -  % of total Revenues -15% -19% -21% -18% -18% -18% -18%
EBITDA Margin - % of revenues 28% 25% 25% 24% 25% 25% 26%
Iberia 20% 16% 16% 15% 15% 14% 14%
LT Contract Generation - % of segment revenues 45% 51% 41% 44% 44% 44% 44%
Liberalised Activities Iberia - % of segment revenues 17% 8% 7% 7% 6% 6% 6%
Regulated Networks Iberia - % of segment revenues 14% 14% 16% 14% 14% 14% 13%
Wind Power  - % of segment revenues 85% 85% 84% 74% 74% 74% 76%
Brazil  - % of segment revenues 33% 31% 29% 29% 28% 28% 29%
Other - % of segment revenues 3% 1% 3% 2% 2% 2% 2%
EBITDA Margin - segment contribution
Iberia 69% 63% 63% 59% 56% 54% 50%
LT Contract Generation - % of Total EBITDA 24% 24% 22% 22% 22% 21% 20%
Liberalised Activities Iberia - % of Total EBITDA 20% 12% 10% 10% 9% 9% 8%
Regulated Networks Iberia - % of Total EBITDA 25% 26% 30% 26% 25% 24% 23%
Wind Power  - % of Total EBITDA 16% 20% 21% 24% 27% 30% 32%
Brazil  - % of Total EBITDA 16% 19% 18% 18% 18% 18% 19%
Other - % of Total EBITDA -1% -1% -2% -2% -2% -2% -2%
EBIT Margin - % of revenues 16% 15% 15% 15% 15% 16% 17%
Iberia 13% 10% 10% 10% 10% 9% 10%
LT Contract Generation - % of segment revenues 31% 39% 30% 33% 33% 33% 33%
Liberalised Activities Iberia - % of segment revenues 11% 2% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3%
Regulated Networks Iberia - % of segment revenues 8% 8% 11% 9% 9% 9% 9%
Wind Power  - % of segment revenues 36% 34% 36% 38% 41% 44% 48%
Brazil  - % of segment revenues 25% 24% 23% 22% 22% 22% 22%
Other - % of segment revenues 9% 4% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5%
EBIT Margin - segment contribution
Iberia 75% 67% 69% 64% 59% 56% 52%
LT Contract Generation - % of Total DA 28% 32% 27% 27% 26% 24% 23%
Liberalised Activities Iberia - % of Total DA 21% 6% 7% 7% 6% 6% 5%
Regulated Networks Iberia - % of Total DA 25% 28% 35% 29% 27% 26% 24%
Wind Power  - % of Total DA 12% 14% 15% 21% 24% 28% 31%
Brazil  - % of Total DA 21% 25% 23% 23% 23% 22% 23%
Other - % of Total DA -8% -5% -8% -7% -6% -6% -6%
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Balance Sheet - EDP Consolidated Pro-Forma 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Property, plant and equipment, net 18.435 20.324 20.708 21.460 21.986 22.471 22.789
Intangible assets, net 9.627 9.963 10.128 10.128 10.128 10.128 10.128
Financial investments, net 618 591 332 332 332 332 332
Deferred tax asset 661 515 511 511 511 511 511
Assets held for sale 0 31 202 202 202 202 202
Inventories 273 357 346 380 425 484 533
Accounts receivable - trade, net 2.008 2.187 2.152 2.363 2.642 3.013 3.316
Acounts receivable - other, net 4.737 4.897 5.169 5.675 6.346 7.236 7.966
Financial assets held for Trading 85 36 0 0 0 0 0
Total Assets 36.444 38.901 39.548 41.051 42.572 44.377 45.777
Share capital 3.657 3.657 3.657 3.657 3.657 3.657 3.657
Treasury stock and share premium 382 388 392 392 392 392 392
Consol. Net profit, reserv, and retaining earnings 3.255 3.810 4.061 4.275 4.566 4.996 5.610
Equity Book Value 7.294 7.855 8.110 8.324 8.615 9.045 9.659
Minority Interest 2.684 2.930 3.277 3.455 3.647 3.865 4.117
Total Equity 9.978 10.785 11.387 11.779 12.262 12.910 13.776
Financial net debt 14.090 16.303 17.053 17.217 17.000 16.492 15.662
Provisions 344 431 415 415 415 415 415
Hydrological correction account 113 75 69 69 69 69 69
Deferred tax liability 772 856 954 954 954 954 954
Accounts payable - Other, net 11.146 10.450 9.670 10.617 11.872 13.537 14.902
Total Liabilities 26.466 28.116 28.161 29.272 30.310 31.467 32.001
Total Equity and Liabilities 36.444 38.901 39.548 41.051 42.572 44.377 45.777
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Note: For E.ON market multiples valuation, E.ON was excluded from the sample. 
 
  
Company Currency Company Description
Enterprise 
Value
Sales EBITDA EBIT EV/ EBITDA EV/ EBIT
Iberdrola EUR
Iberdrola S.A. generates, distributes, trades, and markets electricity in the United Kingdom, United 
States, Spain, Portugal, and Latin America.  The Company specializes in clean energy and more 
specifically wind power.
48.191 31.648 7.000 3.855 6,9 12,5
Endesa EUR
Endesa, S.A. generates, distributes, and trades electricity in Spain, Italy, France, Portugal, North 
Africa, and Latin America.  The Company distributes natural gas, operates co-generation plants, and 
treats and distributes water.
24.753 32.686 7.265 4.653 3,4 5,3
E.ON EUR
E.ON AG operates in power generation and gas production businesses. The Company's operations 
include electric generation at conventional, nuclear, and renewable-source facil ities; electric 
transmission via high-voltage wires network; regional distribution of electricity, gas, and heat; 
power trading and electricity, gas, and heat sales.
60.356 112.954 6.935 2.712 8,7 22,3
ENEL EUR
Enel S.p.A. generates, transmits, distributes, and trades electricity.  The Company operates 
hydroelectric, geothermal, and other generating plants.  Enel, through subsidiaries, also provides 
fixed-line and mobile telephone services, installs public l ighting systems, and operates real estate, 
factoring, insurance, telecommunications, and Internet service provider businesses.
96.985 77.573 17.198 11.366 5,6 8,5
EDF EUR
EDF SA (Electricite de France) produces, transmits, distributes, imports and exports electricity.  The 
Company, using nuclear power, coal and gas, provides electricity for French energy consumers.
65.194 65.307 13.931 7.646 4,7 8,5
CEMIG BRL
Companhia Energetica de Minas Gerais- CEMIG generates, transmits, and distributes electricity in 
the Brazil ian State of Minas Gerais.  Cemig serves industrial, commercial, residential, and rural 
customers.  The Company generates electricity primarily through hydroelectric plants.
42.765 15.814 5.438 4.413 7,9 9,7
RWE EUR
RWE AG generates, distributes, and trades electricity to municipal, industrial, commercial, and 
residential customers. The Company produces natural gas and oil, mines coal, delivers and 
distributes gas, and supplies drinking water. RWE AG operates mainly in Europe.




Gas Natural SDG, S.A. distributes natural gas in Spain and Latin America.  The Company also 
operates gas storage facil ities, owns and operates a fiber optic backbone telecommunications 
network, markets energy management products and household gas appliances, and installs gas 
heating systems.
27.395 21.076 4.697 2.947 5,8 9,3
GDF Suez EUR
GDF Suez offers a full  range of electricity, gas and associated energy and environment services 
throughout the world. The Company produces, trades, transports, stores and distributes natural 
gas, and offers energy management and climatic and thermal engineering services.




International Power plc is an international power generating Company.  The Company also provides 
wholesale production of fresh water through saltwater desalination, production and distribution of 
steam, district heating via cogeneration, gas transportation and renewable energy.
41.118 16.167 4.244 2.754 9,7 14,9
Centrica GBp
Centrica PLC is an integrated energy company offering a wide range of home and business energy 
solutions. The Company sources, generates, processes, stores, trades, saves and supplies energy 
and provides a range of related services.
20.109 22.824 2.436 1.241 8,3 16,2
EDP - Comparable Companies Financial Indicators (currency millions) Market Multipes
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6.7. Transaction Multiples 
 
 




Year Target Name Target Country Acquirer Name Acquirer Country Deal Status
Percent 
Sought
EV/ EBITDA EV/ EBIT
2011 Southern Union Co USA Williams Cos Inc/The USA Terminated 100 12,5 18,7
2011 Southern Union Co USA Energy Transfer Equity LP USA Complete 100 12,5 18,7
2011 Constellation Energy Group Inc USA Exelon Corp USA Complete 100 10,4 20,6
2011 DPL Inc USA AES Corp/The USA Complete 100 8,7 11,7
2011 EDF Energies Nouvelles SA France Electricite de France SA France Complete 50 14,4 21,5
2011 Progress Energy Inc USA Duke Energy Corp USA Pending 100 12,2 18,9
2010 Nicor Inc USA AGL Resources Inc USA Complete 100 8,2 17,4
2010 NSTAR LLC USA Northeast Utilities USA Complete 100 8,8 13,6
2010 Prime Infrastructure Group Australia
Brookfield Infrastructure 
Partners LP
USA Complete 60 2,1 70,0
2010 Boralex Power Income Fund Canada Boralex Inc Canada Complete 100 7,7 16,7
2010 GenOn Energy Holdings Inc USA GenOn Energy Inc USA Complete 100 2,3 3,0
2010 Allegheny Energy Inc USA FirstEnergy Corp USA Complete 100 6,9 9,4
2010 Innergex Power Income Fund Canada
Innergex Renewable Energy 
Inc
Canada Complete 84 11,1 20,5
2009 AltaGas Utility Group Inc Canada AltaGas Ltd Canada Complete 80 7,8 13,4
2009 Thuega AG Germany
Mainova AG,Stadtwerke 
Hannover AG,N-ERGIE 
Germany Complete 100 71,3 98,8
2009 Canadian Hydro Developers Inc Canada TransAlta Corp Canada Complete 100 26,2 54,3
2009 Venture Production PLC Great Britain Centrica PLC Great Britain Complete 71 4,3 6,9






Complete 100 3,5 5,1
2009 Kogeneracja Poland
Electricite de France 
SA,EnBW Energie Baden-
France Complete 100 4,8 7,4
2009 Italgas Hellas SpA Italy Snam SpA Italy Complete 100 6,0 8,0
Comparable Transactions - Energy utilities with diversified geographies and/or business lines
Transaction Description Transaction Multiples
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E.ON and EDP - Key Indicators 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Revenues
E.ON 79.974 92.863 112.954 107.704 108.634 111.678 114.722
EDP 12.198 14.171 15.121 15.702 16.251 17.158 17.857
EDP vs E.ON 15% 15% 13% 15% 15% 15% 16%
Total Operating Costs
E.ON 66.999 79.517 103.661 97.704 96.894 99.461 101.967
EDP 8.835 10.558 11.365 11.866 12.251 12.909 13.298
EDP vs E.ON 13% 13% 11% 12% 13% 13% 13%
EBITDA
E.ON 12.975 13.346 9.293 10.000 11.739 12.217 12.755
EDP 3.363 3.613 3.756 3.836 4.000 4.249 4.560
EDP vs E.ON 26% 27% 40% 38% 34% 35% 36%
EBITDA margin
E.ON 16% 14% 8% 9% 11% 11% 11%
EDP 28% 25% 25% 24% 25% 25% 26%
CAPEX
E.ON 8.655 8.286 6.524 6.731 6.504 6.277 6.050
EDP 3.235 2.667 2.161 2.259 2.063 2.050 1.907
EDP vs E.ON 37% 32% 33% 34% 32% 33% 32%
EBITDA - CAPEX
E.ON 4.320 5.060 2.769 3.269 5.235 5.940 6.705
EDP 128 946 1.595 1.578 1.936 2.200 2.652
EDP vs E.ON 3% 19% 58% 48% 37% 37% 40%
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6.9. EDP Privatization: Summary of competing bids final terms  
 
Adapted from “Chineses ganham corrida à EDP”, Expresso, 22 Dezembro 2011, Anabela 
Campos 
 
Chinese company China Three Gorges won the bid for EDP’s public sector shares 
 
The 3 finalists’ bids are summarized below: 
 
China Three Gorges: 
 € 3,45 per share 
 € 2.000 million line of credit to EDP by Chinese bank CDB 
 Commitment to secure an additional € 2.000 million line of credit 
 Commitment to acquire minority stakes in EDPs wind farms amounting up to € 2.000 
million 
 Commitment to building a wind turbine factory in Portugal  
 
E.ON: 
 € 3,25 per share 
 Partial payment with shares of Spanish subsidiary (including thermoelectric and coal 
electricity generation and distribution) amounting to € 1.800 million   
 Commitment to finance EDP in an amount up to € 400 million 
 Commitment to acquire minority stakes in EDPs wind farms 
 Commitment to create a renewable energy Research & Development Center  
 
Electrobras: 
 € 3,28 per share 
 Offer subject to shareholder agreement with other shareholders in order to secure 
voting control  
 Commitment to acquire minority stakes in EDPs wind in an investment up to € 1.000 
million 
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